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State Courts and Constitutional SocioEconomic Rights: Exploring the
Underutilization Thesis
Helen Hershkoff* and Stephen Loffredo**
Comparative constitutional scholars are beginning to recognize the
importance of subnational constitutions for law-making and governance.'
In particular, commentators emphasize that a polity's decision to assign
some aspects of constitutional practice to the subnational level
significantly affects the political choices available to constitutive units
within a larger system and to the system overall.2 So far, the emerging
* Herbert M. and Svetlana Wachtell Professor of Constitutional Law and Civil
Liberties and Co-Director, The Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program, New York
University School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges support for this project
from The Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund. As an associate
legal director of the ACLU and a staff attorney with The Legal Aid Society, the author
was co-counsel or amicus curiae in cases involving state constitutional socio-economic
rights to public schooling and indigent assistance.
** Professor of Law and Director, Economic Justice Project, Main Street Legal
Services, City University of New York School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges support for this project from the CUNY School of Law summer research
fund. The author is co-counsel in the Taylor litigation, and as a staff attorney with The
Legal Aid Society and as a consulting attorney for the Urban Justice Center was cocounsel in cases involving state constitutional socio-economic rights to indigent
assistance, including McCain v. Koch, discussed in this Article.
An earlier version of this paper was presented on September 22, 2010 at a
Symposium on State Constitutional Law sponsored by The Dickinson School of Law of
the Pennsylvania State University. We thank Gary Gildin, Justin Robert Long, Alan Tarr
and Robert Williams for comments, Brian Leary, Jessica Rubin-Wills, Michael Baum,
Craig Dan Haaren, Inayat Ali Hemani, Anderson Heston, Wonjun Lee, and Elina
Sheykh-Zade, students at New York University School of Law, for research assistance,
and Robert Anselmi and Hetty Dekker for administrative support. We also appreciate the
insights of the state court judges who spoke with us: Judith S. Kaye and Albert M.
Rosenblatt.
1. See John Dinan, Patterns ofSubnational Constitutionalismin FederalCountries,
39 RUTGERS L.J. 837, 837 n.2 (2008) (collecting sources that evince a "renewed interest
in subnational constitutions").
2. See generally Ronald L. Watts, Foreword: States, Provinces, Lander, and
Cantons: International Variety Among Subnational Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 941,
958-59 (2000) (discussing possible effects of subnational constitutions encouraging a
"multi-sphered polity").
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literature largely has focused on the structural aspects of constitutional
design, including such features as whether to have a Parliament or a
legislature, whether to have a bicameral or a unicameral legislature, and
so forth.
Although the political space reserved for subnational
constitutions also extends to substantive issues, the nascent comparative
literature on this subject suggests that constitutive units do not always
develop the substantive authority that their constitutions afford them.
Rather, commentators observe that "subnational units in federal systems
more often underutilize their constitution-making competency than they
overutilize it." 4 Some commentators further argue that because of
agency costs, subnational constitutional rights may tend to be judicially
under-protected or only weakly entrenched in the sense of being subject
to easy amendment, reversal by popular referendum, or dilution through
legislative backlash.
The United States federal system well illustrates the potential of
subnational constitutions-the constitutions of the fifty states-to
encourage a poly-vocal approach to substantive issues involving rights
and obligations. To take an important example, the federal Constitution
is silent on many questions of socio-economic concern. 6 However,
almost every state constitution in the United States explicitly addresses
important public goods such as education, income assistance, and
housing support, and some state courts have tried to enforce these
provisions in the face of legislative indifference or recalcitrance. Other
state courts, however, treat socio-economic constitutional provisions as
nonjusticiable and so underutilize the authority that the state constitution
sets out.8 Inherent in U.S.-style federalism and a vision of states as
3. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1583, 1585 (2010) ("Our interest is the relationship between the superconstitution
and the design of the subconstitution.").
4. Robert F. Williams & G. Alan Tarr, Subnational ConstitutionalSpace: A View
from the States, Provinces,Regions, Ldnder, and Cantons, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 15 (G. Alan Tarr, Robert F. Williams & Josef

Marko eds., 2004).
5. See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 3, at 1604-06 (distinguishing entrenchment
from expansion of rights).
6. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1131, 1132-35 (1999) (discussing the
Supreme Court's refusal to acknowledge any federal constitutional right to affirmative
aid from government).
7. See id. at 1135-36 (discussing difference in approach between federal and state
constitutions).
8. See, e.g., Robert Deichert, Note, Honoring the Social Compact: Arguingfor a
State Duty of Protection Under the Connecticut Constitution, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1069,
1070 (2001) (explaining that the Connecticut Supreme Court has not interpreted the
"social compact" clause of the Connecticut Constitution to create enforceable affirmative
rights).
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"laboratories of experimentation" is an understanding that state
constitutions will differ both from the national Constitution and from
each other, and also that state courts will take different approaches in
interpreting state documents. 9 However, a serious question is presented
if state courts decline to enforce the rights that their subnational
This Article explores the subnational
constitutions include.
constitutional underutilization phenomenon in the context of U.S.
judicial enforcement of state constitutional socio-economic rights.' 0
The topic of state court enforcement of state socio-economic rights
is important for a number of related reasons. Until recently, most U.S.
scholars placed socio-economic rights outside the constitutional domain
and beyond the enforcement power of courts." But the experience of
national courts abroad-largely that of the South Africa Constitutional
Court in recognizing a justiciable right to housing in the Grootboom

9. See New State Ice
dissenting) ("It is one of
courageous state may, if its
and economic experiments.

Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
. . ."); see also Lawrence Friedman, Subnational Treasure:

"Federalism,SubnationalConstitutions, and Minority Rights," 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L

L. REv. 261, 266 (2005) (observing that "state supreme court justices are scarcely of one
mind on the potential reach of their states' constitutional commands"); Hans A. Linde,
The State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Difference!, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1273, 1273 (2005) ("The point of federalism ... lies in the scope it leaves for
differences.").
10. In examining the judicial underutilization of subnational constitutional rights, we
do not address a related but separate question of litigant underutilization of such rights.
See Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitutions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864
(2008) (observing that plaintiffs "have occasionally raised state constitutional claims
under social welfare provisions"). Particularly in areas affecting the poor, a lack of legal
resources seriously affects the ability to mount any litigation campaign. See Frank B.
Cross, The ErrorofPositive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 880-87 (2001) (discussing the
economics of positive rights enforcement and stating that "[p]oor individuals and, to a
degree, groups representing the poor may lack the resources to advance effectively"
constitutional positive rights). Legal services lawyers over the last two decades have
been barred by government funders from filing class actions, from asserting
constitutional challenges, and from using private funding to fill the gap. See David
Luban, Taking out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-InterestLawyers,
91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 220-26 (2010) (discussing federal restrictions on legal services
lawyers). In other areas, such as educational adequacy cases, the cost of litigation, in
terms of discovery and expert preparation, may dissuade private counsel from asserting
state constitutional claims.

See generally CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL:

ACTIVISTs, BUREAUCRATS AND THE CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE (2009). Whether

subnational rights are underutilized by affected communities relative to federal rights,
and the relation between legal resources and judicial enforcement of socio-economic
rights, are interesting questions, but not the ones that we pursue.
11. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Inequality, and Class in the StructuralConstitutional
Law Course, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1243 (2007) (reporting that "[t]he majority
view ... appears to be that poverty and class inequality ... lie beyond the Constitution's
cognizance or concern").
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decisionl 2 -has convinced some skeptics that socio-economic rights may
be enforced through judicial remedies that the literature describes as
"weak" or "experimentalist" in the sense of affording the political
branches broad latitude in devising constitutional remedies.13 Often
ignored in these discussions is the experience of U.S. state courts
enforcing state constitutional socio-economic rights and lessons that can
be learned from their remedial approaches.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the framework: it
briefly describes state constitutional socio-economic rights in the United
States; it identifies the conceptual problems that positive rights have
raised in the academic literature; and it describes the theories of judicial
review that commentators have offered in response to these problems.
Part II examines selected state court decisions in positive-rights cases.
The cases are illustrative; we do not purport to be examining a large-N
data set. State courts successfully have enforced socio-economic rights
for at least the last four decades, and although some of their practices
resemble those associated with "weak" and "experimentalist" review,
they also involve coercive remedies of a traditional sort. Some state
courts, however, persist in treating such rights as nonjusticiable.14 Part
III explores the puzzle of state-constitutional underutilization. This Part
surveys possible political science explanations, and then puts forward an
alternative reason that might account for a state court's failure to enlist or
to develop subnational socio-economic provisions: the state court's
inappropriate reliance on federal constitutional doctrines that inhibit
federal courts from entering relief against state and local government
defendants. These doctrines, we argue, are inapposite in the state court
context and ought not to constrain state judicial decision-making. We
conclude by urging comparative constitutional scholars to attend more
closely to the work of U.S. state courts when they assess the force and
importance of constitutionalizing social and economic rights."

12. Gov't of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.) (involving
claims to shelter by individuals who had become homeless when evicted from private
land designated for subsidized housing).
13. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ix (2008) (discussing
"weak" review); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (discussing "experimentalist" review).
14. See Pascal,supra note 10, at 871 (expressing the view that "state courts have not
readily taken up the banner of affirmative rights," focusing on rights to public assistance).
15. Cf Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1861
(2010) ("Yet it remains a striking fact that there has been more comparative work
between American Supreme Court and European and Canadian statutory interpretation
methodology than comparative work examining our own state courts.").
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Soclo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS
AND THEORETICAL RESPONSES CONCERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW

"Students of federal systems have tended to focus their attention on
the federal constitutions that frame the entire polity while neglecting the
constitutional arrangements of the constituent polities," Daniel J. Elazar
A generation later, scholars concerned with
wrote in 1987.16
comparative constitutional socio-economic rights continue to give only
minimal treatment to the constitutions of America's fifty states and to the
decades-long efforts of state courts in enforcing socio-economic rights
such as those to schooling, income support, and indigent defense. This
Part briefly surveys socio-economic provisions in U.S. state
constitutions, considers the conceptual difficulties associated with
positive rights in the context of subnational constitutions, and describes
theories of judicial review that respond to some of these problems.
A.

State ConstitutionalSocio-Economic Provisions

Many commentators point to the absence of a constitutional
commitment to socio-economic rights as a marker of American
The federal
exceptionalism relative to the rest of the world.17
Constitution assumes the existence of property rights in its inclusion of a
damage remedy for the government's taking of private property for
"public use";' 8 it also assumes the existence of contract rights by
prohibiting the states from "impairing the obligation of contracts." 9 But
absent from the text are the so-called positive rights that have become
typical features of post-World War II constitutions that deal with such
20
necessities as schooling, health care, job security, and income support.
Indeed, commentators underscore that the United States has taken the
lead in opposing the inclusion of such rights in international human
16. DANIEL.J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 174 (1987).
17. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack
Social and Economic Guarantees?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
90, 91-93 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (discussing absence of welfare rights from federal
Constitution in contra-distinction to contemporary foreign constitutions).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall "be deprived of...
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation"); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall
"deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law").
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (providing that "no State shall enter into ... any law
impairing the obligation of contracts").
20. See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar ParadigmandAmerican Exceptionalism,
in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 89-91 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006)
(discussing positive constitutional rights as an aspect of "inherent human dignity"). See
generally Terence Daintith, The ConstitutionalProtection of Economic Rights, 2 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 56, 59 (2004) (distinguishing between property rights and contemporary forms
of social and economic rights).
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rights regimes. 2 1 A leading comparative constitutional casebook thus
underscores "the marked contrast between Europe and the U.S." in their
constitutional treatment of affirmative socio-economic rights:
"[a]lthough welfare concerns at one time were high on the American
political agenda (President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms included
'freedom from want'), . . . [i]n the U.S. government is not seen to be

affirmatively responsible for the welfare of its citizens."22
A more complex story emerges when the comparative focus is
enlarged to include the subnational constitutions of the fifty states (and
even of the territories) in the United States. Here, almost every
constitutive unit's constitution refers to socio-economic rights. Some of
these provisions entered state constitutions in the twentieth century with
the rise of the modern administrative welfare state, but many of them
trace back to the state's entrance into the Union or shortly thereafter.
Thus, for example, the constitution of Massachusetts, one of the original
thirteen states, includes a right to education that dates to the constitution
that it adopted in 1780.23 The states carved from the Northwest Territory
were required to include provision for free common schools in their
constitutions as a condition of statehood.24 State constitutions in the
United States also are notorious for their susceptibility to amendment,25
and in some states, the constitution has been amended many times, to
add, to remove, and to revise socio-economic provisions.
21. See Philip Alston, Putting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Back on the
Agenda of the United States 3 (New York Univ. School of Law, Ctr. for Human Rights &
Global Justice Working Paper No. 22, 2009) (stating that the U.S. "has played a central
role in discouraging and sometimes blocking the development of the concept of
economic, social and cultural rights").
22. NORMAN DORSEN, MICHEL ROSENFELD, ANDRAS SAJO & SUSANNE BAER,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1354 (2d ed. 2010).

Although federal statutes protect certain social and economic interests (such as the right
to a safe workplace, the right to join a union, and the right to be free from racial, ethnic,
or gender discrimination in the workplace), the regulatory network is not comprehensive
and is subject to majoritarian over-ride. Id.
23. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, chap v., § 2 ("Wisdom and knowledge, as well as
virtue ... being necessary for the preservation of.

.

. rights and liberties . .. it shall be the

duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth to cherish
the interests of literature and the sciences.").
24. See Carl E. Kaestle, The Development of Common School Systems in the States
of the Old Northwest, in ". . . SCHOOLS AND THE MEANS OF EDUCATION SHALL FOREVER
BE ENCOURAGED": A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1787-1880, 31, 32

(Paul H. Mattingly & Edward W. Stevens, Jr. eds., 1987) (discussing provisions of the
Northwest Ordinance dealing with public schooling).
25. See, e.g., Note, California's ConstitutionalAmendomania, 1 STAN. L. REV. 279,
279 (1949) (referring to "the easy amending procedures of most states" and their use "by
the electorate for direct lawmaking"). But see Bruce E. Cain & Roger E. Noll, Malleable
Constitutions: Reflections on State ConstitutionalReform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1520
(2009) (discussing amendment trends).
26. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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Positive-rights provisions in state constitutions reflect the diversity
that is associated with the "states as laboratories" metaphor: they include
so-called "progressive" rights that are associated in international circles
with the promotion of human dignity-for example, rights to income
support, to education, and to housing 27-as well as collective rights, such
But as one
as achieving the goal of a healthy environment.28
commentator observes, regarding state constitutional income-support
provisions, "[n]o two constitutional provisions are exactly the same."29
In addition, some state constitutions include socio-economic provisions
that are expected to run not simply against the government, but also
against private actors.3 0 Commentators tend to equate the practice of
extending constitutional norms to private relations-so-called
"horizontality"-as a contemporary development, yet at least some of
these state constitutional provisions date back to the nineteenth-century
and reflect Progressive-era reforms aimed at protecting industrial
workers from unfair labor practices and ensuring safe employment
settings.
Socio-economic provisions play both a substantive and a structural
role in state governance in the sense of defining individual rights and
regulating inter-branch relations. The federal government operates under
a theory of limited and enumerated powers, which confines federal
action to the affirmative grants of authority in the national Constitution.
By contrast, state governments build on a theory of plenary power, which
presumes a background source of police power. The decision to include
socio-economic provisions in a state constitution thus is understood as a
mandate to the legislature that narrows the scope of political discretion.3 2
In some state constitutions, authority for carrying out particular socioeconomic functions is delegated to constitutive units within the state.33
Finally, some positive rights in state constitutions are intended to alter
27. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (describing the provision of welfare as a
"public concern"). See generally HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS
OF THE POOR 3-4 & nn. 29-33 (1997) (discussing state constitutional welfare rights).
28. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII ("Natural Resources").
29. William C. Rava, State Constitutional Protectionsfor the Poor, 71 TEMP. L.
REV. 543, 551-52 & app. at 569 (1998).
30. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 188-204
(2006) (discussing state constitutional provisions involving workplace conditions).
31. See Helen Hershkoff, "Just Words ": Common Law and the Enforcement of State
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1541-47 (2010)
(discussing adoption of constitutional provisions regulating private work-places).
32. See Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions
as Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 189, 208 (2002) (discussing
plenary theory of legislative authority).
33. See Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24
CONN. L. REv. 773, 780 (1992) (distinguishing between home rule and special districts
for purposes of local control over constitutional functions).
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the relation of the judiciary to the other branches of government, serving
to expand or to contract the jurisdictional space in which courts review
and assess political outputs. 34
B.

The Problems ofPositive Rights

Socio-economic rights remain hotly contested features of national
constitutions. In the United States, the idea of federalizing a right to
income support or to education remains, as Frank I. Michelman has put
it, "contentious"35-a circumstance reconfirmed by the uproar
surrounding the 2010 enactment of a federal statutory right to health
care.36 So it may be somewhat surprising that commentators have not
mounted a wholesale attack on the inclusion of socio-economic rights in
state constitutions. An indirect criticism of positive rights may draw
from concerns that state constitutions are too long, too prolix, too mired
in "statutory" detail, and too attendant to matters considered to be trivial
from the federal perspective.3 7 But it is unusual to find academic articles
that target state constitutional socio-economic rights for particular
criticism. The dearth of scholarly treatment could reflect a general lack
of attention to issues of inequality and social provision,3 or,
alternatively, could signal endorsement of subnational positive rights or
at least an attachment to the federalism-grounded idea of having states
and localities remain primarily responsible for the provision of social

34. See generally John Dinan, Foreword: Court-ConstrainingAmendments and the
State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983 (2007) (discussing state
constitutional amendments that constrain judicial power).
35. Frank I. Michelman, Democracy-BasedResistance to a ConstitutionalRight of
Social Citizenship: A Comment on Forbath,69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1893, 1893 (2001).
36. See Editorial,Health Care Reform and the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2010, at
A26 (discussing negative reactions to enactment of federal health statute); see also
Puneet K. Sandhu, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States Learn from
ForeignModels of Health Rights Jurisprudence?,95 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1165-67 (2007)
(discussing legislative debates about health care throughout the twentieth century);
Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010) (declaring portions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act unconstitutional).
37. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 767 (1992) (questioning whether an "intelligible claim" can be made
about state constitutions given, among other features, their prolixity and attention to
trivia).
38. See Loffredo, supra note 11, at 1242-44 (noting that academic interest in "the
constitutional dimensions of wealth, poverty, and class" has faded dramatically in recent
years); see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 33 (40th anniversary
ed., 1998) ("Those who might themselves be subject to equalization have rarely been
enthusiastic about equality as a subject of social comment. As a result, there has
anciently been a muted quality about debate to the subject.").
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services.39 Or, the lack of scholarly treatment could reflect a continued
scholarly indifference to state constitutions and to the tendency, until
recently, for comparative constitutional discussion to focus only on
national documents. 40
This is not to say that state constitutional socio-economic provisions
do not at particular political moments generate boisterous criticism,
triggering the "amendomania" for which state constitutions are
notorious. 4 1 Alabama eliminated a right to education from its state
constitution in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education;42 Montana
voters altered their constitution to overturn a state supreme court decision
that had barred any "arbitrary" exclusion of poor people from the state's
general relief program;43 and California tax payers voted to impose strict
revenue-raising limits on the state to limit judicial enforcement of a right
to education." But the late twentieth-century has seen a remarkable
absence of legislative and popular campaigns to eliminate socioeconomic rights wholesale from state constitutions.45 For this reason
alone, the state courts' underutilization of such rights raises a puzzle that
is worth exploring. We consider three possible explanations.
1.

Positive Rights Are Not Constitutional Rights

State courts' underutilization of state constitutional socio-economic
provisions may reflect a lingering skepticism about the legitimacy of
"positive rights" and whether they ought to count as rights in any
conventional sense. The dominant argument against socio-economic
rights has been definitional: rights provide protection against the
39. See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice:
Safeguarding the Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1,
1 (2010) (stressing the importance of cooperative federalism to education policy).
40. See James A. Thomson, State Constitutional Law: Some Comparative
Perspectives, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 1059, 1059-64 (1989) (discussing the academic
community's "benign neglect" of state constitutions); see also Tushnet, supra note 13, at
1-15 (positing that American constitutional law does not include "weak" review but
focusing only on federal courts).
41. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of
Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223, 233 (1984).
42. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Helen Hershkoff, School
Finance Reform and the Alabama Experience, in STRATEGIES FOR SCHOOL EQUITY:
CREATING PRODUCTIVE SCHOOLS IN A JUST SOCIETY 24, 26 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., 1998)
(discussing 1956 amendment to Alabama Constitution).
43. See Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 745 P.2d 1128 (Mont. 1987); MONT. CONST.
art. XII § 3(3) (as amended by MONT. CONST. amend. No. 18, approved Nov. 8, 1988).
44. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2346
(2003) (discussing Proposition 13's restrictions on local property taxation in California).
45. See generally Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 3, at 1610-11 (noting that "since
the 1960s, the number of [state constitutional] revisions has declined dramatically, while
amendments are increasing in frequency").
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government and so are negative in conception; they do not demand that
the government take affirmative action or engage in a protective
function.46 In this vein, a great deal of scholarship has focused on
whether the distinction between negative and positive rights is real or
apparent, and whether it is entitled to any conceptual weight. Other
critics take a consequential approach. Some argue that including socioeconomic rights in a constitution exposes other rights to unnecessary
jeopardy, for it creates the possibility-and some might say the
inevitability-that elected branches will fail to respect such rights and so
encourage overall disrespect for constitutional limits. 47 Still other critics
oppose including socio-economic rights in a constitution because they
object either to the content of such rights or to the demands that such
rights will place on governing institutions: they disagree on the merits
whether a fair and reasonable society, one that commands our loyalty and
our tax dollars, ought to organize, demand, and expend public resources
in securing aspects of material well-being at the cost, to some, of
personal autonomy.4 8 In response, commentators have emphasized that
the line between so-called negative and positive rights is unstable. 49 On
this view, all rights, whether to free speech or to free association, to
counsel in criminal cases or to a civil jury, require affirmative protection
from the government, and so depend on the public expenditure of funds
and resources.50
This is not the occasion to re-examine the debate over the
appropriate status of socio-economic rights. It is notable, though, that
positive-rights provisions in some state constitutions date to the founding
of the Republic. The traditional nature of these provisions as state
creations ought to carry some weight even if the federal Constitution
does not embrace them. Moreover, elsewhere the legitimacy of socioeconomic rights has been confirmed over time by their inclusion in
international conventions and in many national constitutions adopted in

46.

Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa, 11

CONST. F. 123, 123-24 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights?]

(discussing this view).
47. For a discussion of this debate as applied to the South Africa Constitution, see
Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, ConstitutionalRopes of Sand or JusticiableGuarantees?
Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1992).
48. For a general discussion of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein, Hayekian
Socialism, 58 MD. L. REV. 271, 299 (1999) (referring to "the dangers that come from
interferences with contractual freedom and with legal efforts to maintain, from the center,
minimum levels of security").
49. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:
WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (W.W. Norton & Co.1999).
50. Id.
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the post-World War II period.5 I Commentators thus speak of a post-war
paradigm that includes the government's protection of material wellbeing as an aspect of individual dignity. 52 Indeed, even in the United
States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's call for a "Second Bill of
Rights" acknowledged the evolving status and fundamental importance
of socio-economic rights as legal rights deserving of respect.
For present purposes, the relevant inquiry focuses on whether it is
appropriate for states to include such rights in their constitutions. On the
one hand, one might argue that with changing circumstances certain
material rights are best administered at the national level to avoid having
states externalize costs, an argument that Richard A. Posner has pressed
and which is only weakly mitigated by doctrines that have developed
under the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 5 4
Codifying national socio-economic rights also may prove to be more
effective given the political situation of groups seeking to enforce such
rights: those likely to benefit from certain kinds of positive rights may
face greater vulnerability at the state and local level, where it is more
difficult to form coalitions and funding and resources may be scarce.s
On the other hand, it is not unusual in the United States for rights to
vary considerably from state to state. Commentators identify "rights
federalism" as a basic feature of the American legal scene, both with
respect to the content of federal constitutional rights and the variety of

51. See, e.g., Angelina Fisher, The Content of the Right to Education-Theoretical
Foundations 8-16 (N.Y.U. Sch. L., Ctr. for Hum. Rts. & Global Just. Working Paper,
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts. Series No. 4, 2004) (identifying right to education in
various international conventions). But see Cross, supra note 10, at 857 (criticizing the
concept of positive rights).
52. See Weinrib, supra note 20, at 89-91.
53. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR's
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (Basic Books 2004)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS].

54.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 519-21 (2d ed. Little Brown

& Co. 1977) (arguing that the absence of a nationally mandated welfare provision invites
states to export poverty, either by setting low benefit levels, or adopting other local
policies that discourage in-migration by poor people from other states, and that such
efforts distort labor markets and impede the efficient deployment of resources); see also
Stephen Loffredo, "IfYou Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi": The Commerce Clause and State
Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 147, 192-93 (1993)
(arguing that state durational residence restrictions on welfare violate the Commerce
Clause, in part because they represent economically inefficient attempts to shift costs to
other states).
55. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 335-43 (Vintage Books 1979) (describing special

vulnerability of welfare programs funded and administered at the state or local level); see
also Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1172-73 (discussing disadvantages of local provision of

welfare relief).
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56

As one commentator explains,
subnational constitutional rights.
pointing to the "crazy quilt" of even federal constitutional rights among
the states in the U.S., "state and local legal norms .. . are highly variable
The classic
and create a functionally irregular rights regime."5
Tieboutian argument supports rights variation: citizens ought to be able
to sort themselves by preference, subject only to a minimal federal
constitutional floor.58 Moreover, rights variation among states advances
the classic federalism value of "states as laboratories," allowing ideas to
percolate up to the national level and avoiding the premature ossification
that rights nationalization might produce.59 Thus, the fact that socioeconomic rights vary from state to state may point to significant gaps in
the federal Constitution but does not undermine arguments for including
such rights in subnational constitutions.
A related criticism of according constitutional status to socioeconomic provisions is that, to be efficacious, they require code-like
specification that is incompatible with the enduring aspects of
constitutional law. Commentators warn that legislators may become
"hobbled by the text of the constitution itself."60 Certainly this criticism
has some purchase as applied to subnational constitutions in the United
States. State constitutions are long and tend to specify regulatory details
that may become obsolete. But this concern does not track an inevitable
feature of state constitutions; many states take a lean approach in
specifying rights to schooling and welfare: the text sets out the purpose
of the constitutional right but omits programmatic details.6 1 In such
instances, the right provides a traditional form of protection against
hostile majorities that may seek to use ordinary politics to subvert
important values.62 The fact that such protection is not as durable as in
56. Cain & Noll, supra note 25, at 1530-36 (identifying rights federalism and
defending its preservation on social-contract and autonomy grounds).
57. Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism:State andLocal Criminal Laws
and the Applicability ofFederalConstitutionalRights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 146
(2009).
58. See Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 96110 (2009) (discussing the arguments for and against Tiebout sorting for public goods).
59. See Cain & Noll, supra note 25, at 1534 (stating that "[d]eciding which rights
should be nationalized is a complex and nuanced exercise ... [and] allowing some rights
variations among the states gives more time to build a national consensus....
60. Daintith, supra note 20, at 88.
61. See Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts are Redefining
State Responsibilityfor Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 281, 290-91, 297-303 (2007) (giving examples of state constitutional
education clauses, which include such terms as "quality," "basic," and "suitable").
62. See Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, and Liberal Political
Justification, I INT'L J. CONST. L. 13, 16-17 (2003) (stating that the
"[clonstitutionalization of social-rights guarantees can provide both a prod and a hook for
ho-hum forms of judicial action in furtherance of the distributive aims these rights
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the federal system is a feature not confined to socio-economic
provisions, and provides no basis for excluding such rights from a state
constitution.
2.

Courts Cannot Enforce Positive Rights

Another recurring criticism of socio-economic rights argues that
courts are institutionally incapable of enforcing positive rights, in part
because they cannot develop manageable standards for carrying out such
rights, and in part because they cannot compel the political branches to
63
The
respect and effectuate the standards that they seek to impose.
argument takes a universalist tone: courts everywhere, of any design,
whether common law or civil law, lack the wherewithal and resources
needed to interpret, to declare, to announce, to order, or to compel
actions that touch on socio-economic rights. The institutional argument
makes an indirect assault on socio-economic rights on the assumption
that without the possibility of judicial enforcement, these provisions hold
no rightful place in a constitution. But as Albie Sachs, Justice of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa, has explained, even if socioeconomic provisions are not enforceable "in the same, self-executing
way as other rights," they nevertheless may serve other important
constitutional purposes: for example, such provisions may serve "as
programmatic indicators" that can be used to interpret other justiciable
rights and may inform a court's interpretation of due process or equality
requirements. 4
The argument about developing manageable standards focuses on
the myriad details that a court must consider in resolving questions that
concern social and economic life. Dean Lawrence Gene Sager thus has
written that cases involving material rights involve "questions of
judgment, strategy, and responsibility that seem well beyond the reach of

represent"); see also Burt Neubome, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900-01 (1989) (stating that with respect to socioeconomic rights, "the most that the state judiciaries can do is to reverse the inertial
political burden in this area").
63. Compare GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (Benjamin I. Page, Univ. Press of Chicago 1991) (arguing that
courts cannot meaningfully affect social and economic change and may trigger
unintended and deleterious consequences), with MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED

AMERICA'S PRISONS (Alfred H. Blumstein & David Farnington, Cambridge Univ. Press
1998) (discussing positive achievements of federal courts in improving prison
conditions).

64.

Albie Sachs, Essay, Social and Economic Rights: Can They Be Made

Justiciable?,53 SMU L. REv. 1381, 1384-85 (2000).
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courts in a democracy."6 5 Whatever the merits of this argument in some
contexts, it seems seriously overstated when applied to state courtswhich in their traditional common-law role have developed rules and
standards for critical aspects of social and economic life ranging from the
marital relationship to property estates, from the employment at-will
doctrine to the warranty of habitability, from the doctrine of common
carriers to the principle of unconscionability, all of which implicate
critical questions of "judgment, strategy, and responsibility." Yet as
Judith S. Kaye, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals
has noted, "[n]o one disputes" the common law authority of state
courts.
Still, the question remains whether state courts have capacity to
compel or to convince the other branches to follow the rules and
standards that they announce. Common law doctrines tend to regulate
areas of life denominated as private, and judicial capacity may weaken as
policymaking requires the development of programmatic strategies, the
raising and spending of public money, and the deployment of
bureaucratic resources specific to the right (as contrasted with general
police, fire, or dispute resolution). As the complexity of enforcement
increases, so might the possibility of slippage between compliance and
mandate, even where the mandate is expressed in open-ended standards.
The polycentric nature of necessary relief heightens the pressure points at
which politics or simple indifference can intervene and subvert judicial
efforts at enforcement. On the other hand, a gap of this sort is likely to
occur whenever the right to be enforced embraces a plural or contested
meaning whether denominated "negative"-such as a due process right
to the provision of adequate notice before the government's taking of
property, a First Amendment right to demonstrate on public streets, or an
equal protection right to travel from one state to another-or
"positive"-such as a state constitutional right to an adequate education.
In all of these contexts the court must devise adjudicative techniques to
address anticipated problems in light of the political context and
constitutional culture.
3.

Judicial Enforcement of Positive Rights Is Anti-Democratic

Even commentators who regard socio-economic rights as justiciable
and so capable of judicial enforcement may question whether it is
democratically legitimate for courts to enforce these provisions against
65. Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1989, 1990 (2001).
66. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1995).
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In some situations, the concern is
legislative and executive officials.
expressed in terms of separation of powers, and so borders on questions
of judicial capacity. In particular, positive-rights cases are said to raise
complex issues concerning the allocation of scarce resources and the
setting of competing priorities that are best left to the political branches.
Other commentary ups the conceptual ante and frames the concern in
terms of democratic justification and political transparency. But the antidemocratic critique rings hollow when those whose interests are most at
stake in the enforcement of socio-economic rights (typically people of
limited means) lack equal or meaningful access to democratic
processes.
Moreover, a great deal of the democratic critique of judicial
enforcement of socio-economic rights assumes a single-court system in
which a central constitutional court reviews the regulatory outputs of a
national legislature or executive. In the United States, federalism
complicates the picture, making it important to disentangle discussions
about democratic legitimacy, separation of powers, and federal-state
relations. Concerns about democratic legitimacy differ at the state level,
where judges throughout the court hierarchy are subject to electoral
accountability and state constitutions may be revised through popular
action. Although elected judges are not legislators, the nature of their
judicial role, given the depth of their common law power, may
differentiate their governance function in significant ways from those of
the Article III courts. States are not required to conform to the federal
version of separation of powers, and in practice legislative and executive
departments differ in some states from their federal counterparts.69
Finally, federalism concerns about having unelected federal judges divest
states of sovereign power ought to carry less, if any, weight when applied
to a state court reviewing state legislative or regulatory outputs.

67. See generally Michelman, supra note 62 (raising and answering these concerns).
68. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA.
L. REv. 1277, 1278-92 (1993) (arguing that some judicial intervention to protect poor
people from disadvantageous political outcomes does not undermine democratic principle
because the poor have been undemocratically denied fair access to political processes).
69. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1153-69 (discussing how state judicial
systems differ from the Article III system); see also Scott R. Bauries, Is There an
Elephant in the Room?: JudicialReview of EducationalAdequacy and the Separation of
Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REv. 701 (2010) (citing differences between
state and federal separation of powers provisions, but finding no evidence that these
differences play a role in educational adequacy litigation).

938

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:4

C. Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights Through "Weak" and
"Experimental"Review
As the previous section suggests, scholars have tended to treat
socio-economic rights as nonjusticiable on the view that their
enforcement invades legislative and executive prerogative and falls
outside judicial capacity to design manageable remedial standards. This
view has undergone significant revision in the last decade: some
commentators credit the South Africa Constitutional Court's decision in
Grootboomo for convincing skeptics that social and economic rights are
justiciable constitutional claims.71 In "an extraordinary decision," one
American commentator wrote in 2000, "the Constitutional Court of
South Africa ... set out a novel and promising approach to judicial
protection of socio-economic rights . .. [that is] respectful of democratic
prerogatives and of the limited nature of public resources, while also
requiring special deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are
not being met." 72 The Grootboom approach consists of recognizing the
justiciability of socio-economic rights, but of limiting relief to a judicial
declaration that the government has a duty to carry out its constitutional
obligation. At least two alternative theories of judicial review now
appear in the literature that are supportive of this approach applied
generally to socio-economic rights: the first is the theory of "weak form"
review and responds directly to questions of the enforcement of positive
rights; and the second is the theory of "democratic experimentalist"
review and responds to orthogonal questions.
1.

Weak-form Review

The idea of weak-form review originated with Stephen Gardbaum's
identification of a "new Commonwealth" model of judicial review which
Mark Tushnet later elaborated, expanded, and renamed.7 3 Exponents of
this theory offer weak-form review in contrast to American-style review,
which is characterized as "strong" and associated with the Article III

70. Gov't of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.) (involving
claims to shelter by individuals who had become homeless when evicted from private
land designated for subsidized housing).
71. See SuNsTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 228 (arguing that
the South Africa Court's approach to social and economic rights "has provided the most
convincing rebuttal yet to the claim that judicial protection [of constitutional positive
rights] could not possibly work in practice").
72. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights?, supra note 46, at 123.
73. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001); see generally TUSHNET, supra note 13.
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courts. 7 4 The exemplar of strong-form review is Cooper v. Aaron,75
where the Court announced that the federal courts, relative to Congress
and the President, are "supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution." 76 Weak-form review tries to untie the Gordian knot of
democratic legitimacy by acknowledging the shared authority of the
different branches of government to interpret and carry out constitutional
rights that affect socio-economic concerns. Tushnet describes this "'new
Commonwealth' model" of review as one in which "courts assess
legislation against constitutional norms, but do not have the final word
on whether statutes comply with those norms.
Weak-form review should not be confused with minimalist review;
rather, "the mark of weak-form review is that ordinary legislative
majorities can displace judicial interpretations of the constitution in the
relatively short run."78 Courts retain authority to assess all legislation for
conformity with constitutional requirements, but operate in a judicial
"middle ground between fundamental rights protection and legislative
supremacy." 79 Commentators posit that "weak-form review comes in
several variants[,]" 80 and may depend on the nature of the socioeconomic right-which Professor Tushnet categorizes as "those that are
merely declaratory, those that provide weak guarantees of social
provision, and those that are interpreted to provide relatively strong
guarantees"m-as well as "the relationships among the types of rights,
weak and strong, and strong and weak enforcement mechanisms."8 2
Commentators posit that "weak" remedies may have a role in enforcing
even "strong" rights, for the judicial practice may encourage the use of

74. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court of Canada,CharterDialogue, and
Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235, 242-43 (2009) ("In comparative constitutional
scholarship on judicial review, the United States is generally understood as the archetypal
model of strong-form---orfinal-judicialreview.") (emphasis in original).
75. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
76. Id. at 18.
77. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at ix; see also Mark Tushnet, State Action, Social
Welfare Rights and the JudicialRole: Some ComparativeObservations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
435, 447 (2002) [hereinafter Tushnet, State Action] (stating that weak-form review
"comes in several variants, but in each a judicial determination of what the constitution
requires is explicitly not conclusive on other political actors, who can respond to the
court's decision through ordinary politics").
78. Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2781,
2786 (2003); see also TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 23 (explaining that "weak-form judicial
review provides mechanisms for the people to respond to decisions that they reasonably
believe mistaken that can be deployed more rapidly than the constitutional amendment or
judicial appointment processes").
79. Gardbaum, supra note 73, at 742.
80. TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 237.
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
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other institutional mechanisms for enforcement. 83 Finally, the literature
observes that weak remedies may become strong remedies, and vice
versa, over time. 84
2.

Democratic Experimentalist Review

Democratic experimentalist review stems from an ambitious project
aimed at reconceptualizing government from the Madisonian tri-partite
division of power to a "directly deliberative polyarchy" that encourages
information-driven solutions to constantly changing problems.85 The
experimental approach-part of efforts at "new governance" -draws
lessons from private firm innovations that are pragmatic in spirit,
collaborative in design, decentralized in structure, and aimed at
developing dynamic solutions that recognize the "volatility and
diversity" of contemporary problems.87 Experimentalism relies on a
variety of techniques, including benchmarking, monitoring, and
feedback, to ensure that local knowledge is identified, and that it is
pooled and that it is shared with others who face similar but
contextualized concerns. The theory is not primarily concerned with the
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights, but its principles and
justifications lend strong support for such efforts.
Within an experimentalist system, courts play the important
coordinative role of ensuring "that subnational experiments fall within
the authorizing legislation and respect the rights of citizens."88 However,
the judiciary's role is not limited to policing the periphery, but also
extends to interpretations at the core of constitutional rights.
83. Id. at 262 (stating "leakage is a more than trivial possibility").
84. Id. at 254-56. The literature offers various examples of weak-form review,
drawn largely from the Commonwealth. The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Section 33, permits the enactment of laws that are inconsistent with certain
Charter provisions subject to a five-year sunset clause. See Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11, s. 33 (authorizing legislation
"notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter").
Similarly, the 1998 British Human Rights Act requires courts to try to interpret statutes
consistently with the European Convention on Human Rights. Human Rights Act, 1998,
c. 42, § 4 (Eng.); see Tushnet, State Action, supra note 77, at 448. However, failing that,
courts must issue a statement of statutory incompatibility to which government ministers
are authorized "to respond in a variety of ways, including modifying the statute on their
own, introducing fast-track legislation to modify the statute, introducing such legislation
in the ordinary course, or doing nothing." See id
85. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 316.
86. See Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory
State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 822-23 (2008) (referring to the "new governance" as "a series
of efforts to reconceive the relationship between the state and those it governs" and as a
"critique of the command-and-control model").
87. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 286.
88. Id. at 288.

2011] STATE COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL Soclo-EcONoMIC RIGHTS

941

Commentators emphasize that this form of experimentalist system does
not currently exist in the United States, but is said to be "emergent" in a
number of different contexts. 8 9 The literature points to state court
education adequacy litigation as an early example of an "experimentalistrights jurisprudence as a dispute shifts from 'merely' how to apply a
generally acknowledged right to whether a right 'really' exists in the first
In place of command-and-control mandates, the
place." 90
experimentalist approach depends on "stakeholder negotiation," "rollingrule regime," and "transparency," and declines to give "determinate
guidance on the question of sanctions," on the assumption that public
identification of noncompliance will trigger nonjudicial interventions at
improvement.9 1 Critics of experimentalist review treat it as only
procedural and warn that the approach may be "somewhat hostile to
judicial articulation of substantive norms."92 These criticisms have been
particularly sharp as applied to the effect of an experimentalist approach
on issues affecting the poor. 9 3
II.

STATE COURTS AND THE CONTINUUM OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

State courts have asserted authority to enforce state constitution
socio-economic rights for at least the last four decades.94 These rights
encompass not only individual claims to government-provided services,
but also structural claims to public funding for rights-infrastructure such
as judicial salaries and indigent defense. The actual experience of state
courts over these decades calls into question conventional arguments that
courts are not capable of enforcing socio-economic rights and that to do
89. Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalismfor Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 357, 358 (2003) (pointing to "the recurrent use of the term emergent in
descriptions of experimentalist constitutionalism").
90. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 465, 466 n.686 (discussing Alabama Coalition
for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. CV-91-0117-R, 1993 WL 204083, at * 1 (Ala. Cir. Ct.
1993)); see also James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183 (2003) (discussing litigation in Texas and Kentucky
as examples of the new-governance approach).
91. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1015, 1067-73 (2004).
92. Alana Klein, Judging as Nudging: New Governance Approaches for the
Enforcement of Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 39 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 351, 356 (2008); see also William S. Koski, The Evolving Role of the Courts in
School Reform Twenty Years After Rose, 98 Ky. L.J. 789 (2009-2010) (discussing school
adequacy litigation in an experimentalist framework).
93. See generally, David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic
Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008)
(criticizing democratic experimentalism in favor of centralized programs for the poor).
94. See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1145-52 (focusing on enforcement efforts
in New York).

942

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:4

so requires unusual or unconventional adjudicative techniques.
Moreover, the depth and range of state judicial practice suggest that the
enforcement of socio-economic rights does not depend on avant-garde
doctrinal constructs or unconventional procedures. Rather, the state
experience reflects a continuum of practices within the space described
in the literature as "weak" and "strong," "conventional" and
"experimentalist"; in some cases state court practices are more coercive
and more substantive than the literature would suggest, but still are
respectful of legislative and executive prerogative; and these state
practices use doctrinal and procedural mechanisms that are standard fare
for state courts-even if not for U.S. federal courts-that are
participatory, facilitative, and conditional in design.95
This Part does not attempt a comprehensive examination of the state
court experience in enforcing socio-economic rights. Instead, we focus
on selected decisions spanning a multi-decade period. These decisions
illustrate the structural and individual-rights components of socioeconomic rights, they spotlight important adjudicative methods, and they
indicate an overall dynamic in the state judiciary's development of
remedies. Throughout this Part our emphasis seeks to decouple two
dimensions of a court's decision: the interpretive dimension and the
remedial dimension. We close by returning to the continuing problem of
a state court's treating socio-economic rights as nonjusticiable.
A.

JusticiabilityandDeclaratoryRelief Fundingfor Courts and
Schools

As the previous Part showed, one of the abiding objections to socioeconomic rights is that their judicial enforcement is "anti-democratic"
and violates separation of powers because of the inevitable fiscal impacts
of a judicial decree. The fact that the resolution of a constitutional
dispute will affect a state's budget priorities ought not presumptively
render a case nonjusticiable if the political branches retain discretion to
make allocational decisions within constitutional limits. On this view,
some state courts, determining the matter to be justiciable, will then enter
a judgment that declares the government's failure to meet constitutional
95. See, e.g., Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn't Enough: Qualitative and
Quantitative Assessments of Adequate Education in State Constitutionsby State Supreme
Courts, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 545, 563-66 (2010). Based on a survey of state court cases
involving state constitutional education clauses, the author writes:
While all of the courts willing to intervene still give much deference to the state
legislature, the form of the intervention differs widely; courts will do
everything from recommending specified outputs required by the new system
to merely presenting self-divined definitions of adequacy.... At no point
during the review of cases does a court seem to strike out against a legislature
in way that violates the separation of powers laid out in each state.
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requirements and announces standards that the government can follow to
achieve compliance, but does not direct or mandate specific action. We
illustrate the relationship between a finding of justiciability and the
litigants' request for declaratory relief in two categories of state
constitutional cases: the first concerns public funding for courts, and the
second concerns public funding for schools.
1.

Public Funding for Courts

In County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,96
Allegheny County sought a court order directing the state "to provide all
funds necessary for the functioning" of the state's unified court system
and "all funds necessary" for the county's courts.97 The county plaintiff
further sought a declaration that it was not obligated to fund its county
courts.98
The Commonwealth Court dismissed the challenge as
nonjusticiable, relying on two of what it characterized as "Baker v. Carr"
factors, 99 namely, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate governmental branch and impossibility of an
appropriate judicial remedy."100 Looking at the first factor, the trial court
held that "the General Assembly . .. has been given the constitutional
power to determine what programs will be adopted in our
Commonwealth and how they will be financed," and that the court was
bound by prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent that "the
legislature alone .. . must ordain a change" in the funding of the court
system since "that power was constitutionally committed to the
legislature in the first place." 0 1 The court did not address explicitly the
second factor as a basis for finding the dispute to be nonjusticiable.
However, the court did make clear that under certain circumstances a
coercive order requiring funding might be appropriate:
the court
emphasized that although the judiciary has "authority to compel the
payment by the local government of those sums of money which are
reasonable and necessary for the county judiciary to function ... unless

96. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 500 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
97. Id. at 1268.
98. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 534 A.2d 760, 761 (Pa. 1987),
vacating County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 500 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
99. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
100. County of Allegheny, 500 A.2d at 1269 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 186).
Pennsylvania courts earlier had relied on the Baker factors in determining whether a
matter was justiciable. See Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 706 (Pa. 1977).
101. County ofAllegheny, 500 A.2d at 1269 (citation omitted).
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the function of the county court system was impaired by inadequate
funding, the courts should not and will not intervene."l 02
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, finding the
matter justiciable.'o3 Again the Pennsylvania court turned to the federal
justiciability standards of Baker v. Carr, but emphasized that even the
federal political question doctrine recognizes the power of the court to
interpret a constitutional provision and to assess whether manageable
standards can be devised to ensure its enforcement. 104 The Pennsylvania
court pointed to Justice Brennan's often overlooked distinction between
nonjusticiability and lack of federal jurisdiction:
In the instance of non-justiciability, consideration of the cause is not
wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry
necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty
asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially
determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be
judicially molded.105
In affirmatively answering the latter two questions-whether a duty can
be identified and its breach can be judicially determined-the
Pennsylvania court emphasized that plaintiffs requested only declaratory
relief: "Since this is a declaratory judgment action, the court's inquiry
concerns the ascertainment of the rights of the parties and whether
protection for the asserted right can be judicially molded."1 06 The
Pennsylvania Court rejected the trial court's reading of the first Baker
factor, finding instead "that although control of state finances rests with
07
the legislature, that control is subject to constitutional limitations."'
The appeals court also held that the second Baker factor provided no
barrier to relief; to the contrary, the matter was justiciable because "the
rights of the parties were able to be determined by construction of the
relevant statutes and constitutional provisions." 0 8 The appeals court
then entered an order declaring the existing finding scheme
unconstitutional and void, but stayed its judgment "to afford the General
Assembly an opportunity to enact appropriate funding legislation"
consistent with the court's holding.' 09
102. Id. at 1270-71.
103. County ofAllegheny, 534 A.2d at 760.
104. County ofAllegheny, 500 A.2d at 1270-71.
105. County ofAllegheny, 534 A.2d at 762 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 198).
106. County of Allegheny, 534 A.2d at 76 (citing The Declaratory Judgments Act, 42
Pa. C.S.A. §§ 7531-7541) (2010).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 765. For the subsequent history to the Pennsylvania case, see infra note
131, and accompanying text.
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The subject matter of the Allegheny lawsuit is unusual, but not
unique: other state courts have faced similar state constitutional claims
involving the adequacy of funding for specific judicial functions,
including judicial salary, and likewise have found the disputes to be
justiciable and appropriate for the entry of declaratory relief. In Maron
v. Silver,"o for example, New York's highest court issued a declaratory
judgment finding that the State's failure to increase judicial salaries for
eleven years violated the state constitutional "Separation of Powers
Doctrine."'1 Although the court did not enter coercive relief, the
opinion underscored its belief that "[w]hen this Court articulates the
constitutional standards governing state action, we presume that the State
will act accordingly."ll 2
2.

Public Funding for Public Schools

State constitutional cases involving claims to educational equity and
to educational adequacy have received the bulk of attention in the
scholarly literature. We emphasize here the relationship between
plaintiffs' requests for declaratory relief and judicial receptivity to
finding that the state constitutional socio-economic claim is justiciable.
In addition, typically the state courts couple declaratory relief with ongoing supervisory jurisdiction, thus using traditional equitable remedies
to enforce rights that seem unconventional because they do not appear in
the federal Constitution. As in the Pennsylvania court-funding case,
many state courts hearing school financing cases have charted a "third
way": these courts have neither renounced judicial power nor exercised
it to its full extent, but rather have chosen to "cue" the political branches
as to their constitutional duties and then allow those actors time and a
zone of permissible discretion within which to meet their constitutional
responsibilities.
Horton v. Meskill (HortonI),113 part of the "first wave" of education
reform cases,"l 4 traces to 1974 when similar lawsuits were pending in
Plaintiffs asserted that Connecticut's
thirty-six other states."'
decentralized school funding method as applied to the town of Canton
110. Maron v. Silver, 925 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 2010).
111. Id. at 915.
112. Id.
113. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
114. The wave metaphor first appears in William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The
Impact of Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School
Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990); see also William E. Thro,
Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
MassachusettsDecision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597, 598 & n.4 (1994).
115. Horton, 376 A.2d at 361 & n.1 (citing Note, A StatisticalAnalysis of the School
FinanceDecisions: On Winning Battles andLosing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972)).
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violated the Connecticut constitution's education clause, which requires
provision of free public schools.H 6 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief." 7 The trial court rejected defendants' claim of
nonjusticiability, finding the requisite adversity between the parties; it
rejected a challenge to plaintiffs' standing, ruling that a plaintiff
"presently eligible for public schooling" may mount a constitutional
challenge to the distribution of funds for public schools; and it rejected
defendants' assertion of sovereign immunity on the ground that
"sovereign immunity is no defense where a complaint charges officials
with violation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights.""'8 Notably, the court
ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Connecticut poses no
barrier to a proper claim for declaratory judgment, and further, that the
declaratory judgment statute must be liberally construed where-as in
Horton itself-the request for relief "concerns a matter 'of considerable
public importance.""' 9 In issuing declaratory relief and retaining
supervisory jurisdiction, the court emphasized that "even if the doctrine
of sovereign immunity might be a valid defense .. . the defense should
not be available where it is of 'considerable public importance' that there
should be a judicial determination of the question that is the subject of
the action for the declaratory judgment." 2 0 At the same time, the court
underscored that responsibility for reforming the state's public schools
rests with the political branches, quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in
San Antonio Independent School Board v. Rodriguez,121 that "the
ultimate solutions [about education policy] must come from the
lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them." 22
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial's
court entry of a declaratory judgment and its decision to retain
jurisdiction over the action.123 The high court emphasized the distinction
"between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity from
liability," emphasizing the judiciary's "duty under a constitutional
government such as ours to decide a justiciable controversy as to the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment[.]"l 24 The state declaratory
judgment procedure, the Connecticut court explained, is "peculiarly well
adapted to the judicial determination of controversies concerning
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Horton, 376 A.2d at 361.
Id.
Horton v. Meskill, 332 A.2d 113, 119-20 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
Id. at 120.
Id.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Horton, 332 A.2d at 120 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58).
Horton, 376 A.2d at 374-75.
Id. at 364.
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constitutional rights and, as in these cases, the constitutionality of state
legislative or executive action."l 2 5 The court further stressed the
importance of the trial court's retention of jurisdiction to enter equitable
orders later in the lawsuit that could be adapted as the other branches
developed solutions.126
Education reform efforts in Connecticut have been a long-running
saga, riding the "waves" that have been associated with litigation of this
sort.12 7 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that later cases
largely have conformed to the Horton I bifurcated model of an early
declaratory judgment allowing the legislature to develop a plan, followed
by judicially-centered participatory hearings to determine whether the
plan conforms to the constitutional mandate or whether additional relief
is warranted. 12 8 This enforcement pattern persists even as the theory of
125. Id. at 365.
126. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court explained:
The [declaratory judgment] procedure has the distinct advantage of affording to
the court in granting any relief consequential to its determination of rights the
opportunity of tailoring that relief to the particular circumstances. In a case
such as the present one, this circumstance is of special importance because the
court, mindful of the proper limitations on judicial intervention, the problems
inherent in the complexities of school financing and the presumption that the
other departments of our government will accede to this court's interpretation
of the state constitution, may properly delay specific direction, affording time
for corrective action and avoiding any "serious interference with the
performance of their functions and with their control over their respective
instrumentalities, funds, and property."
Id. (quoting Joseph D. Block, Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign
Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1946)). In response to the court's
declaratory order, the legislature adopted statutory reforms, which it then amended, and
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of those revised efforts. See Horton v. Meskill,
445 A.2d 579, 581 (Conn. 1982) (citing 1979 Conn. Acts 79-128; 1980 Conn. Acts 80404; 1980 Conn. Acts 80-473). Various towns and boards of education moved to
intervene in the action, and the court denied their request, instead contemplating a twophased process that would give putative defendant-parties a voice in the remedial stage of
the litigation should the legislation be held unconstitutional. Id at 583. The trial court
later held the legislature's plan to be "constitutional in design but unconstitutional in
part," and the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed that finding under a standard adapted
from federal court review of state apportionment plans, see Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d
1099, 1106 (Conn. 1985), and, finding error, set aside the trial court's judgments and
remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the statutes were unconstitutional
and to design appropriate relief. Id. As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained: "In
litigation that raises constitutional issues that have systemic implications for the operation
of government, it is appropriate for a trial court to pursue a joint consideration of right
and remedy." Id. at 1111.
127. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and InstitutionalConstraints: A Reexamination of the JurisprudentialHistory ofEducationalFinance Reform Litigation,43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1188 (2003) (referring to "three waves of reform").
128. See e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206,
222 (Conn. 2010) ("In the present case [alleging state constitutional claims to a "suitable"
education], the complaint clearly requests a declaration of a constitutional violation, with
the precise remedy being left to the defendants in the first instance."); Seymour v. Region
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relief has expanded from that of equalizing the funding of educational
resources to a thoroughgoing assessment and redefinition of what
characterizes an adequate education. 12 9 The Connecticut court has
justified its approach as one grounded in "[p]rudence and sensitivity to
the constitutional authority of coordinate branches of government,"1 30
while rejecting arguments that socio-economic rights fall outside the
judicial power to enforce.' 31
One Bd. of Educ., 803 A.2d 318, 324 (Conn. 2002) ("We . .. consider the question of
justiciability on the premise that the plaintiffs seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of. . . [state statute pertaining to school funding], with the remedy that they propose to be
considered by the legislative branch."); Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1290 (Conn.
1996) ("We have decided [in suit involving claims to "substantially equal" educational
opportunity under state and federal constitution provisions] to employ the methodology
used in Horton I."). For a criticism of the Connecticut court's approach, focusing on
Sheff, see Justin R. Long, Enforcing Affirmative State Constitutional Obligations and
Sheff v. O'Neill, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 277, 291 (2002) (reporting that in Sheff "[t]he
majority opinion provided plenty of bombast about the importance of finding a remedy,
but granted only declaratory relief aimed at politely persuading the general assembly and
champagne-popping governor to find a solution using 'energy and good will"' (quoting
Sheff 678 A.2d at 1290)). But see Justin R. Long, Demosprudence, Interactive
Federalism, and Twenty Years of Sheff v. O'Neill, 42 CoNN. L. REv. 585, 606, 608
(2009) (characterizing Sheff as a "liberty-enhancing counterweight to U.S. Supreme
Court decisions" that "urges politicians and ordinary people to respond to its holding with
democratic vigor, encouraging a popular debate about national constitutional values and
priorities").
129. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 90, at 204-05 (discussing the shift in
theoretical focus of the state court cases).
130. O'Neill, 678 A.2d at 1290.
131. Id. at 1291 ("'Our answer is this: a denial of constitutionallyprotected rights
demandsjudicialprotection; our oath and our office require no less of us.' Our oath, our
office and the constitutional rights of the schoolchildren of Hartford, require no less of us
in this case.") (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)).
The New York Court of Appeals likewise has considered the adequacy of public
funding for the state's schools. In 1995, the court declared that the New York
Constitution's education clause requires the state "to offer all children the opportunity of
a sound basic education." Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 655
N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995). That ruling led to a trial at which plaintiffs established that
inadequate public funding had deprived children in New York City of "the
constitutionally-mandated opportunity for a sound basic education." Id. at 667. The
appeals court affirmed that finding, and directed the State to ensure, by means of
"[r]eforms to the current system of financing school funding and managing schools ...
that every school in New York City would have the resources necessary for providing the
opportunity for a sound basic education." Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of
New York, 801 N.E.2d 326, 348 (N.Y. 2003). The court set a deadline for legislative
action, and elaborated "signposts" to guide the government in developing an appropriate
remedy. Id at 350.
In response to the court's order, the Governor established a state-wide commission
to study reform of the education financing system. The point of the process was to
compel the legislature to undertake the role that the constitution assigns to it: to
investigate problems and devise solutions that reflect reasonable responses to
constitutional requirements. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53
(N.Y. 2006). The commission issued recommendations, and the Governor and State
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Regulatory Guidance and Injunctive Relief Emergency Shelter

Another objection mounted against socio-economic rights asserts
that courts lack capacity to develop substantive standards to implement
affirmative constitutional provisions such as public schooling, health
care, or a clean environment. Rather, these rights are said to depend on
policy choices that are best assigned to a legislature or administrative
agency with the institutional capacity to collect information, assess
expert analyses, update solutions, and make tough policy choices. The
view that courts lack capacity to develop policy is radically at odds with
the traditional role of state courts as common law courts. It also ignores
the experience of state courts that have successfully derived
constitutional standards from common law principles to guide the
enforcement of socio-economic rights. 13 2
In McCain v. Koch, 133 destitute, homeless families with children in
New York City sued the City Department of Social Services, asserting a
right to emergency shelter and seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.134 The trial court entered an interim order directing that "when
Senate endorsed a reform that called for $1.93 billion to remedy the identified problems.
Id at 55. The Legislature nevertheless failed to enact the reform before the trial court's
deadline, instead appropriating only $300 million in increased educational assistance. Id.
Judicial proceedings resumed, and the trial court "appointed a blue-ribbon panel of
referees 'to hear and report with recommendations."' Id. at 56. After extensive
investigation, the referees reported that $5.63 billion were needed to remedy the
identified problems, and the trial court confirmed that recommendation. Id. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Governor's proposed reform package was
not unreasonable. Id. at 57-58. The court explained: "Our deference to the Legislature's
education financing plans is justified not only by prudent and practical hesitation in light
of the limited access of the Judiciary "to the controlling economic and social facts," but
Id.
also by our abiding "respect for the separation of powers ....
132. The "standards-based" literature tends to emphasize a court's drawing guidance
from standards that are exogenous to the state or to the judiciary, rather than from
common law principles. See e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 211-12 (discussing
educational standards derived from "monographs prepared by university-based
educational research centers").
133. McCain v. Koch, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
134. Plaintiffs' claims on appeal rested on the federal and state constitutional equal
protection clauses, on Article XVII of the state constitution ("The aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its
subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to
time determine.") and on federal and state statutes. See McCain, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 723,
730, order rev'd in part, 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987). An earlier New York consent
decree recognized a right to emergency shelter on behalf of single destitute men. See The
http://coalhome.3cdn.net//98ddd439f5elc43409_6gm
Callahan Consent
Decree,
6bnxa2.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2011); see also City of New York v. Blum, 470
N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (setting forth operating standards for shelters).
The intermediate appeals court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
of their constitutional and statutory claims to a right to emergency shelter. See McCain,
502 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
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providing emergency housing for homeless families with children,
[defendants must] assure, insofar as practicable, that such housing meets
specified minimal standards of health, safety and decency suitable for
young children, including placement in light of educational needs."l 3 5
Shortly after, the trial court issued a decision that converted the interim
order into a preliminary injunction providing, among other things, that
"once the defendants have undertaken to provide emergency shelter ...
the shelter provided should meet reasonable minimum standards."' 36
These minimal standards required a bed or crib for each family member
"with clean and sufficient sheets and blankets," "a sufficient number of
clean towels," "sufficient space," accessibility to "a sanitary bathroom
with hot water," sufficient heating, "basic furniture essential for daily
living," and window guards and locks on the outside door."' The trial
court emphasized that in setting "general principles by which the
agencies may be guided," it was prescribing standards that "are not
immutable nor exhaustive, but indicative of the minimum standards
which this society at this time finds acceptable within the meaning of the
word shelter," and that the court could equitably enforce compliance
with those standards. 3 8
Defendants initially appealed to the Appellate Division, the state
intermediate appeals court. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial
court's declaratory order, emphasizing that plaintiffs based their claims
on "mandatory, not precatory, statutory and constitutional directives,"
and that "such claims present a justiciable controversy even though the
activity contemplated on the State's part may be complex and rife with
the exercise of discretion."'39 However, the intermediate court vacated
the trial court's injunctive order setting out minimum standards for
emergency shelter, holding "that the adequacy of the level of welfare

135. McCain, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 725 (discussing Interim Order dated June 20, 1983,
Special Term (Greenfield, J.)). Three months later, the State Department of Social
Services issued a state-wide administrative directive based on the trial court's interim
order establishing placement and accountability protocols for the provision of emergency
shelter. Id. at 725-26 (discussing Administrative Directive 83-ADM-47, providing that
local social service departments are "to assist homeless persons in obtaining housing").
The State Department of Social Services also promulgated 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 352.3 (g) &
(h), requiring local departments to inspect hotels and motels used for client referrals.
McCain, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 725-26.
136. McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
137. McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 63-64 (N.Y. 1987) (quoting from injunction of
June 27, 1984).
138. McCain, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
139. McCain, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 731 (citing Klosterman v. Cuomo, 463 N.E.2d 588,
596 (N.Y. 1984)).
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benefits is a matter committed to the discretion of the Legislature,"l 4 0 but
invited the Court of Appeals to revisit its state constitutional decisions in
this area.
The Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, vacated this
portion of the Appellate Division's order, but in so doing found it
unnecessary to address its prior state constitutional decisions.141 The
high court held that a trial court in New York has "power . .. to fashion
equitable relief .. . requiring . .. housing which satisfies minimum
standards of sanitation, safety and decency" when emergency housing is
provided to the destitute. 14 2 The Court of Appeals explained: "There is
no question that in a proper case . .. [the New York trial court] has

power as a court of equity to grant a temporary injunction which
mandates specific conduct by municipal agencies.

..

."4

The court

further rejected arguments that the action was nonjusticiable: there was
no encroachment on executive or legislative prerogative at the time of
the initial interim order, because the State Department of Social Services
had not yet issued regulations concerning minimum standards, and no
conflict developed later because the departmental regulations "are more
extensive and stringent than the injunction."1 44
The McCain court used two traditional techniques to enforce a right
to emergency shelter without declaring that such a right exists under the
state constitution. First, the court used a prohibitory injunction to
constrain defendants from engaging in rights-violating activity.145
Second, the court incorporated into its injunction affirmative standards
guiding the provision of emergency shelter-standards that can be traced
to the common law warranty of habitability and were offered on a
140. Id (citing Matter of Bernstein v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y. 1977)). The
intermediate court emphasized that it felt bound by earlier decisions of the Court of
Appeals and stated:
The inability of courts to set even minimum standards for meeting "the
legitimate needs of each recipient" upon the failure of the Legislature to do so
is discouraging, saddening, and disheartening. When thousands of children are
put at risk in their physical and mental health, and subject to inevitable
emotional scarring, because of the failure of City and State officials to provide
emergency shelter for them which meets minimum standards of decency and
habitability, it is time for the Court of Appeals to reexamine and, hopefully,
change its prior holdings in this area. The lives and characters of the young are
too precious to be dealt with in a way justified, as argued, on the ground that
the government's efforts are more than token. They may be more than token,
but they are inadequate.
Id. (citation omitted).
141. McCain, 511 N.E.2d at 65.
142. Id at 62-63.
143. Id. at 64.
144. Id. at 67.
145. Id. at 63-64.
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conditional basis until the state's executive officials stepped forward to
meet their duty of prescribing minimum standards for such shelter.1 46 To
borrow from Ellen A. Peters, former Chief Justice of the Connecticut
Supreme Court, the McCain court's reliance on common law achieved an
"accommodation between the two branches" of state governance, using a
law-making technique that has "no readily discernible parallel in the

federal courts."1 4 7
C.

ProgramExclusions and Coercive Mandates: ImmigrantAccess to
Health Care

State courts also have deployed coercive remedies in cases
involving socio-economic rights. The coercive remedies in these cases
are "strong form" in the sense of involving mandatory directives that
defendant must enforce to bring conditions into constitutional
compliance; these remedies are not regarded as measures of last resort
and should be distinguished from contempt citations or fines that are
ordered to punish non-compliance with a court's prior order. 14 8 The
judiciary's use of coercive remedies to enforce constitutional socioeconomic rights usually occurs in the context of an on-going service
program from which plaintiffs allege they have been excluded for
reasons that violate state law.149 One commentator refers to this form of
146. Id. at 63-67.
147. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away From the Federal Paradigm: Separation of
Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1556-57 (1997).
148. Professor Tushnet has suggested that the use of coercive remedies might reflect
"a dynamic, born of frustration, leading the courts to convert weak remedies into strong
ones." Tushnet, supra note 13, at 256. The Pennsylvania experience with public funding
for a unified court system illustrates well the dynamic that Prof. Tushnet describes. See
Dana Stuchell, Constitutional Crisis in Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Supreme Court v.
Pennsylvania General Assembly, 102 DICK. L. REV. 201, 231-32 (1997) (reporting that
after nine years of legislative inaction, the Pennsylvania court ordered the General
Assembly to enact a state-wide funding scheme by a fixed date and appointed a master to
prepare recommendations for the design of and transition to a new court system); see also
Matthew J. Zeigler, Marrero v. Commonwealth: The Commonwealth Court Struggles to
Preservethe PoliticalQuestion Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J.PUB. L. 781, 797
(1999) (discussing appointment of master in judicial funding case). For other examples,
see Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. JudicialPower in the
Kansas School FinanceLitigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021 (2006). For examples of a
state court's use of contempt or fines as post-judgment enforcement mechanisms, see
Tamia Perry, Note, In the Inierest of Justice: The Impact of Court-orderedReform on the
City of New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1239, 1246-48 (1998) (describing the New
York court's enforcement efforts in the McCain litigation which included civil contempt,
fines, and ordering "the offending officials to stay overnight in the welfare offices [where
defendants illegally lodged plaintiffs].").
149. These cases map onto a category that the literature describes as dependent "on
democratic instantiation in the first instance, typically in the form of a legislated program,
with the judiciary generally limited to an interstitial role." See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking
Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 203, 245 (2008) (drawing from
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relief as "gap-filling." 50 The coercive remedies in these cases are
strong-form, in the sense of involving mandatory directives.
To see the structure of these decisions, consider a New York case
involving the exclusion of legal immigrants from the state's Medicaid
programs. In 1996, Congress resolved to "end welfare as we know it"
and adopted legislation that, among other provisions, drastically
restricted the eligibility of legal immigrants for Medicaid and other
federally funded assistance.151 In essence, the 1996 law provided that
immigrants admitted as lawful permanent residents could obtain
Medicaid from a state program receiving federal financial support, but
only if the state elected to cover them; immigrants permanently residing
in the United States under color of law ("PRUCOL") were barred from
federally-supported Medicaid.' 52
New York has both a federally-supported and a wholly state-funded
Medicaid program.15 3 The purpose of the latter is to extend medical
assistance to certain low-income residents (principally non-elderly, nondisabled adults without minor children) who do not qualify for federally
financed Medicaid. Historically, New York had not distinguished
between legal immigrants and U.S. citizens in its provision of
Medicaid.154 But on the heels of the federal legislation, the state
disqualified broad categories of legal immigrants from receiving state- or
federally-funded Medicaid.'55 An amended Section 122 of the N.Y.
Social Services Law barred from the state-funded program any
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 78-79

(1983) ("Welfare rights are fixed only when a community adopts some program of
mutual provision.")); see also Amartya Sen, Human Rights and the Limits of Law, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2913, 2915 (2006) (clarifying a distinction between "human rights"
and "actual legislation inspired by the idea of human rights," but questioning whether
"the practical relevance of human rights [is] entirely parasitic on legislation that has
actually occurred"). The existence of the program mitigates arguments that the right in
dispute is indeterminate. Cf TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 228 (referring to "reasonable
disagreement over what an abstractly described constitutional right means in a particular
context"). The democratic-instantiation argument may understate the difficulty of
determining whether a program exists. See, e.g., Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70
(N.Y. 2009) (rejecting claims by aged, blind or disabled persons and legal resident aliens
of New York that they are entitled to the same level of state-funded benefits received by
aged, blind or disabled citizens under the federal Supplemental Security Income
Program).
150. See Klein, supra note 92, at 369; see generally Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1148
(discussing these cases as part of a typology of socio-economic rights enforcement).

151. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered provisions of8 & 42 U.S.C.).
152. For a fuller description of the complex rules governing immigrant access to
Medicaid, see Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 27, at 198-99.
153. Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (N.Y. 2001).
154. Id. at 1089-90.
155. Id. at 1091-92.
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immigrant not eligible for federally-supported Medicaid; the state also
imposed a five-year ineligibility period on legal immigrants who entered
the U.S. after August 22, 1996, even though federal law gave states the
option of extending federally-supported Medicaid to such persons
without any waiting period. 156 The state continued to guarantee
emergency medical treatment to excluded immigrants.' 57 In response to
these statutory changes, plaintiffs-a group including immigrants with
permanent-resident status and those with PRUCOL status-challenged
their exclusion from the state Medicaid program as a violation of Article
XVII of the New York Constitution, which guarantees "aid, care and
support" to the needy.158
The trial court agreed that the statute violated Article XVII and
granted declaratory and injunctive relief. 59 The court found that under
Tucker v. Toia,160 the state has a mandatory constitutional duty to provide
aid to the needy, and may not withhold assistance "solely on the basis of
criteria having nothing to do with need"' 6 '-here, plaintiffs' immigration
status. The Appellate Division, the intermediate appeals court, reversed,
holding that the restrictions on immigrant eligibility for Medicaid
affected only the "manner and level" of medical assistance provided, and
did not create a wholesale exclusion on the basis of non-need criteria. 16 2
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division,
finding that the New York statute violated Article XVII "by imposing on
plaintiffs an overly burdensome eligibility condition having nothing to
do with need, depriving them of an entire category of otherwise available
basic necessity benefits." 63 The court acknowledged that the state
constitution "affords the State wide discretion . .. in setting benefit
levels," but it declined to treat the statutory exclusion as a provision that
"merely set[s] levels of benefits for the needy." 64 Rather, "The concept
of need plays no part in the operation" of the statute and thus could not
justify the eligibility lines that the legislature had drawn.16 5
Cases that implicate a plaintiffs exclusion from an existing benefit
program require the court to assess whether the legislature's action is
156. The description of the N.Y. Medicaid Program is taken from the opinion in
Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1091-92. The system of exclusion is more complex than the text
indicates. See id
157. Id. at 1093.
158. Aliessa v. Whalen, 694 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). Plaintiffs also
asserted claims under the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 311-14.
159. Id. at 316.
160. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977).
161. Whalen, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (citing Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 452).
162. Aliessa v. Novello, 712 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
163. Id. at 1093.
164. Id
165. Id
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consistent with what commentators have called the "core" of the
constitutional commitment; this analytic process engages fairly
traditional methods of statutory and constitutional interpretation and the
disputes involving these questions present justiciable controversies well
within conventional notions of judicial power.166
D.

The ContinuingProblem ofFalse Nonjusticiability

The state experience reflects an increasing understanding of the
ways in which socio-economic rights can be treated as justiciable and be
judicially enforced both on an individual and on a collective basis.
However, as Mauro Cappelletti, the eminent Florentine professor of civil
procedure, observed in a related context forty years ago, "A trend ... is
not yet an accomplished reality. Enormous obstacles are in the way."l67
Many state courts continue to treat positive rights provisions as
nonjusticiable or defer to legislative decisions without determining
whether the government action conforms to constitutional
commitments. 168 Indeed, in some categories of state constitutional socioeconomic rights, dismissals of cases on nonjusticiability grounds appear
to be on the rise. 169 We highlight here three state court decisions
illustrating three persistent errors.
1.

Decoupling the Court's Interpretive
Legislature's Remedial Authority

Duty

from

the

Probably the most profound error that courts make when addressing
socio-economic rights is the failure to decouple the court's interpretive
duty to construe a constitutional provision from the assessment of
whether a different branch of government has complied with the
constitutional requirement. Determining whether a right is justiciable
166. Daintith refers to the "core" of the constitutional commitment. See Daintith,
supra note 20, at 87.
167. Mauro Cappelletti, New Dimensions of Justice, in IN HONOREM OF MAURO
CAPPELLETTI (1927-2004): TRIBUTE TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAWYER 53, 61
(Marcel Storme & Federico Carpi eds., 2005) (discussing the implications of
constitutional law for procedural developments).
168. See Pascal, supra note 10, at 875 (referring to "[t]he limited and deferential
review that state courts give welfare legislation"); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State
Constitutionalismand the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 1325, 1392 (2010)
(reporting that seven of the states examined "demonstrate a general reluctance to
recognize affirmative, enforceable health rights").
169. See, e.g., Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State
Constitutional Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 761-64 (2009) (reporting that during
the last decade, "[T]he doctrine [of nonjusticiability] appears to have lost its status as an
outlier of limited persuasion [in education financing cases] and has appeared on the scene
with new vigor").
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requires the court to take an antecedent interpretive act before asking
whether the government has violated the constitutional norm or whether
enforcement of the norm is committed exclusively to the legislative or
executive branch. Thus, the Supreme Court of Washington, relying on
Baker v. Carr,emphasized that:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action
of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is
itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. 170
Ellen A. Peters, former Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme
Court, thus has referred to the "dual assignment" of state court judges in
state constitutional positive rights cases: "In construing and applying
these uniquely state-centered constitutional provisions, state courts ...
must not only define the scope of the affirmative state constitutional
obligation at stake, but they must also determine whether the state has
fulfilled its constitutional duty."' 7 1
She adds:
"Defining the
constitutional right is the quintessential judicial obligation, but at least
initially, elected officials, rather than judges, can better determine the
precise contours of the appropriate policy response."l 72
Within this "dual assignment," state courts possess interpretive
responsibility to articulate the scope and nature of the constitution's
meaning, even if the other branches possess initial remedial
responsibility to effectuate a constitutional duty. Moreover, even as the
political branches take steps to cure a constitutional violation, the court
retains interpretive authority-using methodological approaches that are
typical to state courts-to assess whether the revised legislation or
program effectuates the right. 17 3 The fact that there may be various
permissible ways to implement the right does not render a claim of
violation nonjusticiable: it remains the court's responsibility to ensure
that the core of the right is effectuated.

170. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 84 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
171. Peters, supra note 147, at 1558.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 929 (Kan. 2005) (emphasizing the
court's authority to assess the legislature's compliance with a remedial order); see also
Vinay Harpalani, Note, Maintaining Educational Adequacy in Times of Recession:
JudicialReview of State Education Budget Cuts, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 258, 259-60 (2010)
(presenting a tripartite approach to state constitutional education cases that looks to
justiciability, constitutional compliance, and remedial compliance).
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Numerous state cases illustrate the binary, yet overlapping nature of
this process. As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained in Sheff v.
O'Neill,174 involving claims to an adequate, desegregated education:
[W]e are persuaded that the phrase "appropriate legislation" . . . does
not deprive the courts of the authority to determine what is
"appropriate." Just as the legislature has a constitutional duty to
fulfill its affirmative obligation to the children who attend the state's
public elementary and secondary schools, so the judiciary has a
constitutional duty to review whether the legislature has fulfilled its
obligation. Considerations of justiciability must be balanced against
the principle that every presumption is to be indulged in favor of
subject matter jurisdiction.175
Similarly, in Maron v. Silver,176 the New York Court of Appeals held
that the State's failure to increase judicial salaries for a period of eleven
years violated the state constitution's "Separation of Powers Doctrine"
because of the manner and means that defendants used to adjust court
compensation.1 7 7 The New York Court of Appeals rejected the
defendants' argument that the judiciary is powerless to adjudicate claims
involving budgetary appropriations; it likewise rejected the defendants'
argument that the judiciary is powerless to adjudicate claims arising
under constitutional provisions that accord discretion to the Legislature
in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities.178 To the contrary, the
court stated, "whether judicial compensation should be adjusted, and by
how much, is within the province of the Legislature.

. .

. [H]owever, [the

question of] whether the Legislature has met its constitutional obligations
in that regard is within the province of this Court."l 79
Taylor v. The State of New York' 80 illustrates the common
conceptual error that results from a court's conflating the question of
judicial power to interpret constitutional socio-economic rights with the
question of judicial deference to legislative choices in implementing such
rights. In Taylor, indigent families and individuals challenged New
York's failure to increase its basic public assistance grant over a
nineteen-year period despite substantial increases in the cost of living
174. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
175. Id. at 1276.
176. Maron v. Silver, 925 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 2010).
177. Id. at 903-05, 915-17. Specifically, the Legislature impermissibly linked its
consideration of judicial compensation to "unrelated policy initiatives and legislative
compensation adjustments;" in addition, the Legislature's failure to provide a cost of
living increase to state judges during the eleven year period caused the real value of court
salaries to decline below constitutionally adequate levels. Id. at 903-05, 915-17.
178. Id. at 917.
179. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
180. Taylor v. State, No. 116370/08, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010).
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that left the grant far below the level necessary to meet essential needs.18 1
In 2008, when plaintiffs filed their complaint, the basic grant remained at
its 1989 level of $137.10 per month for an individual.182 Plaintiffs
alleged that the Legislature's failure to make any fact-based assessment
of the adequacy of the grant for a period of two decades and its failure to
set the grant at a reasonable level violated Article XVII, the welfare
clause of the New York Constitution.'8 3
After the action was
commenced, the Governor proposed and the Legislature approved a
thirty percent increase in the public assistance grant, and the trial court
subsequently dismissed the amended complaint, holding that Article
XVII "explicitly leaves it to the discretion of the Legislature" to set
public assistance benefit levels, and therefore the judiciary has no power
"to review whether the amount of aid allocated by the Legislature is
[constitutionally] sufficient."' In so ruling, the Taylor court ignored the
basic distinction between the Legislature's discretion to design welfare
programs-which is entitled to deference under the appropriate standard
of review-and the court's own core function of determining whether
those programs satisfy the constitutional mandate. As the Court of
Appeals earlier had made clear, the state constitution gives the
Legislature "discretion" to ascertain and define the State standard of
need, but the Legislature's exercise of that discretion must be
"reasonabl[e]" and "is subject to judicial review." 8
2.

Recognizing the Manageability of Declaratory Relief

A closely related error involves state courts, relying on federal
"political question" criteria to rule claims of socio-economic right
nonjusticiable, even where plaintiffs seek only declaratory relief. In
1984, Hans A. Linde, then a Justice on the Oregon Supreme Court,
wrote: "Ifa 'political question doctrine' exists in a state court, I have not
heard of it." 86 Since then, state courts have increasingly invoked the
federal political question doctrine as grounds for dismissing state
constitutional socio-economic cases as nonjusticiable,18 7 even where

181. Complaint at ff 5-9, 17-32, Taylor, No. 116370/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 16,
2010).
182. Id. at126.
183. Taylor, No. i16370/08, slip op. at 2-4 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1, which
obligates the state to provide for "the aid, care and support of the needy").
184. Taylor, No. 116370/08, slip op. at 3, 7.
185. Lovelace v. Gross, 605 N.E.2d 339, 343 (N.Y. 1992).
186. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REv. 165, 189-90 (1984).
187. See Christine M. O'Neill, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use
of the Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to EducationalAdequacy Claims, 42
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declaratory relief is an available remedial option.' 88 The error is failing
to distinguish declaratory from injunctive relief-a distinction clearly
articulated by the Washington Supreme Court in a case involving the
constitutionality of that state's public school system:
Where the question is one of great public interest and has been
brought to the court's attention with adequate argument and briefing,
and where it appears that an opinion of the court will be beneficial to
the public and to other branches of the government, the court may
exercise its discretion and render a declaratory judgment to resolve a
question of constitutional interpretation.

. .

. Declaratory procedure is

peculiarly well suited to the judicial determination of controversies
concerning constitutional rights and, as in this case, the
constitutionality of legislative action or inaction. 89
Pendleton School District 16R v. State of Oregon'90 illustrates how
the court may enter declaratory relief as a first step toward the
government's achieving constitutional compliance.
In Pendleton,
various school districts and students filed a declaratory judgment action
to determine whether the Legislature had failed to fund the public school
system at the constitutionally required level.1 9' The trial court dismissed
all claims and the Court of Appeals (Oregon's intermediate appellate
court) affirmed.192 However, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed in
part, holding that plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory judgment "that
the legislature has failed to fund the Oregon public school system at the
level sufficient to meet the quality education goals established by
law."193 The court further held that injunctive relief to secure the
required funding would not yet be appropriate;1 94 the court expected that
the declaratory judgment would play a dynamic role in moving the
Legislature toward constitutional compliance. This use of declaratory
relief, fairly typical of state practice, has been described as "at once more

COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 545, 546 (2009) (reporting that seven states have relied on

the political question doctrine to dismiss education cases as nonjusticiable).
188. See Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 221
(2010) (reversing dismissal of action as nonjusticiable where "at least one of the
plaintiffs' desired remedies supports the justiciability of their claims").
189. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 80 (Wash. 1978)
(en banc).
190. Pendleton Sch. Dist. 16R v. State, 200 P.3d 133 (Or. 2009).
191. Id. at 135.

192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 145.
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active and more restrained" than federal practice, and is an important
feature of socio-economic rights enforcement.19 5
3.

Treating
Socio-Economic
Legislations"

Programs

as

"Established

As the previous subpart indicated, some commentators posit that
socio-economic rights can be judicially enforced only in the context of
an existing legislative program.' 96 Certainly once socio-economic rights
have been "placed in legislation . .. they stand shoulder to shoulder with
other established legislations."' 97
Some state courts, however,
mistakenly turn this insight on its head, insisting that the government's
establishment of a socio-economic program extinguishes the court's
power to assess constitutional compliance. Mixon v. Grinker,19 8 a New
York case involving the health and shelter needs of indigent persons with
HIV-related illness, illustrates this form of error.199
In Mixon, indigent homeless persons in New York who suffered
HIV-related illness as defined by the AIDS Institute of the State
Department of Health claimed a state constitutional entitlement to shelter
benefits on par with those provided to needy persons with AIDS as
defined by the Federal Centers for Disease Control. 2 00 Essentially, the
plaintiffs wanted non-congregate housing rather than placement in
barracks-style shelters with the general homeless population. The trial
court denied defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds that the issues
were nonjusticiable, and the intermediate appeals court affirmed.20 '
About a year later, defendants, without the compulsion of a court order,
announced a new policy of providing housing to individuals with
plaintiffs' medical condition in "segregated spaces in municipal
shelters ... to house up to 12 individuals with HIV-illness or other
medically frail individuals in a dormitory-style room" while maintaining
195. Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 222 (citing
Michael Besso, Sheff v. O'Neill: The Connecticut Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics,
22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165, 212 (2003)).
196. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 87-100, 123-24 (Yale Univ. Press 2004)
(discussing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), as an example of the U.S. Supreme
Court's power to protect constitutional welfare norms through adjudication, only once
Congress has enacted welfare programs).
197. Sen, supra note 149, at 2915.
198. Mixon v. Grinker, 669 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1996).
199. Id. For a discussion of the New York Court of Appeals' overall approach to the
AIDS epidemic, as well as a criticism of the Mixon decision, see Armen H. Merjian, The
Court at the Epicenter of a New Civil Rights Struggle: HIV/AIDS in the New York Court
ofAppeals, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 115 (2002).
200. Mixon, 669 N.E.2d at 819.
201. Mixon v. Grinker, 556 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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"common eating and bathroom facilities with other shelter residents." 202
Individuals with infectious tuberculosis were excluded from these
facilities and were to be referred to a hospital.203 Plaintiffs challenged
the adequacy of this revised shelter program and the court conducted a
trial and heard conflicting medical opinions.20 4 The trial judge,
underscoring that defendants' plan "must, unless irrational, be upheld by
the courts which should not determine which of conflicting medical
opinions is correct," declared that the challenged program failed even
this level of deferential review and that "emergency circumstances"
justified judicial intervention because defendants could not "reliably
determine promptly" whether shelter residents suffered from drugresistant tuberculosis, a disease that had "reached near epidemic
proportions among the homeless who are HIV infected." 2 05 The trial
court declined to order provision of the same benefits provided to CDCdefined AIDS patients, and it emphasized that it was "unable to state any
rules for determining" the adequacy of the housing provided; but it
declared that it would be irrational to house more than four persons of
the plaintiff class in one congregate room and ordered that "the housing
to be provided to plaintiffs contain adequate ventilation, with the
adequacy to be certified by the City Commissioner of Health, employing
,,206
recognized standards appropriate to the illness of the residents.
The Appellate Division, New York's intermediate appeals court,
affirmed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs did not have a state
constitutional right to benefits on par with CDC-defined AIDS
patients.20 7 However, the Appellate Division also held that "[w]hen the
government ... undertakes to provide emergency housing for the
homeless, it must do so in a way 'which satisfies minimum standards of
sanitation, safety and decency."' 20 8 Based on the trial court's fact
finding, the intermediate appeals court held that defendants' plan, "even
with the trial court's attempted improvements," failed to "provide[ ] for
'the minimum level of habitability which defendants now must meet' in
such circumstances." 20 9 The intermediate appeals court, moreover,
rejected defendants' argument that the judiciary lacks interpretive
authority in areas involving the "allocation of limited resources," and
202. Mixon, 669 N.E.2d at 819-20. After the trial, the CDC revised its definition of
AIDS to include previously excluded HIV-related illnesses. See Mixon v. Grinker, 595
N.Y.S.2d 876, 879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
203. Mixon, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
204. Id. at 880.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 881.
207. Mixon v. Grinker, 627 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
208. Id. (citing McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 62-63 (N.Y. 1996)).
209. Id. at 673 (citing Koch, 511 N.E.2d at 67).
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that the court is required to defer to the professional judgments of
defendants' medical experts even if contrary evidence is presented.2 10
The intermediate appellate court vacated and remanded for a hearing on
steps needed to make the provision of shelter to the plaintiffs "minimally
habitable," emphasizing that the defendants' plan "must present more
than an illusion of protecting the HIV-ill from exposure to
tuberculosis."2 1
The Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, reversed.2 12 In a
six-paragraph opinion, the court held that "judicial scrutiny" is not
available once the defendants have "implemented a comprehensive
program;" rather, the trial court's role is limited to ensuring enforcement
with the defendants' standards and the court lacks equitable authority to
devise "standards of minimum habitability."213 The court provided no
meaningful explanation for treating the issue as nonjusticiable, other than
to say that the use of equitable authority "is an extraordinary judicial task
reserved for a situation when no departmental guidelines exist. . . ."214
But this statement clearly begs the question of whether administrative
determinations are subject to constitutional and statutory review for
compliance with law-a question the Court of Appeals, like other courts,
has answered in the affirmative, even if subjecting such determinations
only to the modest scrutiny of rationality review.215
III. EXPLAINING SUBNATIONAL UNDERUTILIZATION OF SOCIO210. Id. at 673-74. The intermediate appeals court set out an approach that draws on
conventional patterns of administrative review:
While we are cognizant of our role in a tripartite system of government, we
decline to adopt the defendants' narrow view which would, in essence, convert
the courts into a rubber stamp for any policy developed by municipal and state
agencies. If, as here, contradictory evidence has been proffered at a non-jury
trial, the court not only has the power, but, in fact, has an affirmative duty to
weigh, assess, and evaluate such evidence. In doing so, the court may consider
those factors ordinarily considered by a finder of fact in assessing credibility
and it need not turn a blind and uncritical eye to the testimony of witnesses
who, as authors and proponents of a given policy, have a vested interest in its
being upheld. Indeed, when, as here, there is compelling evidence which
undermines the purported rationale of an agency's decision or proposal, a court
should not fail to act simply out of deference to an agency's proposal,
particularly when such a failure would endanger the health and safety of
individuals who are among the most vulnerable and least able to obtain redress
through the other branches of government.
Id. at 674.
211. Id. at 675.
212. Mixon v. Grinker, 88 N.Y.2d 907, 911 (1996).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Merjian, supra note 199, at 187 (noting that the "right to challenge
governmental actions or decisions as unreasonable, irrational, or arbitrary and capricious
is, in fact, well established in New York law").
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ECONOMIC RIGHTS

So far we have shown that state courts use a variety of techniques to
enforce state constitutional socio-economic rights. The question remains
why some state courts-and why some courts within a state-persist in
treating state constitutional positive rights as nonjusticiable. In this Part,
we set out the underutilization thesis as it applies to state constitutional
socio-economic rights and survey some possible explanations based on
themes that recur in the political science literature. Next, we contribute
to the discussion by offering an alternative legal explanation: that
although inter-system differences between state and federal courts ought
to justify state court remedial independence in cases involving state
constitutional socio-economic rights, the conception of judicial role that
informs federal remedial doctrine exercises a constraining effect on state
courts that is inhibiting and inappropriate.
A.

The UnderutilizationThesis and State Socio-Economic Rights

The underutilization thesis posits that subnational units do not fully
utilize the constitutional law-making authority that a national state
affords them. Thus, a recent study of the subject concludes that "often
subnational component units make political, qualitative decisions not to
assert their subnational constitution-making competency, not to occupy
fully the space legally allotted to them." 216 Here we examine a
component of this thesis, namely, the subnational judiciary's
underutilization of its authority to elaborate and enforce a subnational
constitution's socio-economic provisions.
In our view, judicial
underutilization must be understood in a temporal context and against a
dynamic background that includes such factors as ease of constitutional
amendment, judicial selection processes, interstate competition, the
constitutional right at issue, and the coalitions and interests that are at
stake. We explore in this section three explanations drawn from
recurring themes in the literature on state courts: strategic decision
making; the attitudinal model; and agency costs.
1.

Underutilization and the Strategic Model of Judging

The underutilization thesis is consistent with a strategic model of
judicial decision making that assumes "judges account for the reactions
of others when advancing their legal or policy preferences." 217 The claim

216. Williams & Tarr, supra note 4, at 14-15.
217. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account:
Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV.
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here is not that judges are corrupt or venal, but rather-to borrow from
Judge Posner-that they seek to maximize "the same thing everybody
else does." 2 18 Application of the strategic model in this context builds on
a distinctive feature of state courts that is well documented in the
literature: the vulnerability of state judges to majoritarian pressure.
Unlike federal judges who enjoy life tenure, judges in many states are
elected to office, 2 19 may be recalled or retained by popular vote,2 20 and
face review through the amendment process. 22 1 As Otto Kaus, former
Justice of the California Supreme Court, put it: "[t]here's no way a judge
is going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain
decisions, especially if he or she has to make them near election time.
That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." 2 22 The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Caperton further underscores the
effect of campaign contributions on judicial decision making.223
State judicial elections, and state judicial selection overall, have
acquired greater salience over the last decade. Commentators now
generally acknowledge that state judges in elective systems face the
threat of popular backlash when ruling in cases that involve unpopular
parties or that threaten the raising of taxes. 2 24 Thus, for example, judges
who face ballot-box pressure have been found to be more likely to rule
1629, 1656 (2010) (relying on LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE 12 (Cong. Quarterly Inc., 1998)).
218. Richard A. Posner, What do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39-40 (1993). Judge Posner focuses,
however, on federal appellate judges, not state judges subject to election. Id. at 4.
219. See Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian
Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 721 (2010) (reporting that 38 states "rely on elections to
select or retain some or all of their judges").
220. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's
Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1969, 1980 (1988)
(pointing to the "substantial" risk that judges will "produce results with which the voters
will agree"); see also Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58
DUKE L.J. 623, 629 (2009) (concluding on the basis of an empirical study of 28,000 state
cases "that under some retention methods, judges' voting is associated with the political
preferences of those who will decide whether the judges keep their jobs").
221. See Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1161-63 (discussing state constitution
revisability).
222. Quoted in Paul Reidlinger, The Politics ofJudging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987).
223. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). See Pamela S.
Karlan, Electing Judges, Judging Elections, and the Lessons of Caperton, 123 HARv. L.
REv. 80, 87 (2009) (stating that "[t]he Justices also all recognized the way in which
judicial elections might color judges' decisionmaking by creating a personal (and
pecuniary) stake related to their desire to retain office").
224. See Devins, supra note 217, at 1634 (discussing the potential for backlash and
the different state-centered methods courts can use "to assess backlash risks"). But see,
David E. Pozen, JudicialElections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
2047, 2129 (2010) (stating that "[e]lected judges . . . will generally seek to avoid
backlash at all costs").
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against the accused in a capital case. 225 Cases involving socio-economic
rights likewise elicit controversy: the myth of negative rights is that they
are revenue neutral and their benefits are equally shared, with positive
rights tarred as tax burdens that unduly benefit special interests. 226 Even
judges who enjoy longer terms of office may feel vulnerable to
majoritarian pressure, for they may be unable to predict the future effects
of a lawsuit.2 27 Intuitively, these trends may correlate with the increasing
number of plaintiff losses in schooling and welfare cases and confirm the
strategic explanation.22 8
2.

Underutilization and the Attitudinal Model of Judging

A competing explanation relies on the attitudinal model of
judging-"that judges are primarily motivated by the desire to
implement their ideological agenda." 2 29 The attitudinal model denies or
dilutes the constraining effect of law on judicial decision making: judges
instead are "freewheeling" ideologues who render decisions based on
their own values. 2 30 What Alexander Volokh calls "an agenda-driven
judge" is a decision maker who wants to implement a "preferred policy
as a rule of law." 23 1 The attitudinal model tends to array judges from
"liberal" to "conservative;" 2 32 political scientists use ideological

225. See Stephen B. Bright, PoliticalAttacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done
amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judgesfrom Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 324-26 (1997).
226. See Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare As We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REv. 471, 47475 (1997) (commenting on the "popular" but "incorrect" "conception that supporting the
poor is too expensive" and that "excessive welfare expenditures produce government
debt and high taxes").
227. Cf David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265,
285 (2008) (discussing whether length of judicial term mitigates majoritarian pressure).
228. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1077, 1081, 1084 (2007) (stating that "[j]udicial elections have become nastier,
noisier, and costlier" and "attacks aim not at defeating incumbent judges, but rather at
raising the turnout of people upset about what they call 'activist' judges"); see also Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist ofLong Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and
American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1351 (2010) (stating that "[s]ince the 1980s,
judicial elections have become increasingly nasty, noisy, and costly").
229. Alexander Volokh, ChoosingInterpretive Methods: A Positive Theory ofJudges
and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769, 773-74 (2008).
230. Barry Friedman, The Politics of JudicialReview, 84 TEX. L. REv. 257, 272-76
(2005) (stating that "[t]he central tenet of the attitudinal model is that the primary
determinant of much judicial decisionmaking is the judge's own values").
231. Volokh, supra note 229, at 790.
232. See Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court ForecastingProject:Legal
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1150, 1157 (2004) (stating that "the attitudinal model is quite good at
predicting the Justices' array along a particular linear dimension" but it is "not
particularly good at situating specific cases ex ante along that linear array").
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proxies-usually, judge's political party affiliation at the time of
nomination or election233-to explain and predict decisional outcomes.2 34
Empirical studies based on the attitudinal model largely have
focused on the decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court. However,
studies of state court decision making are consistent with the "significant
relationships" established in the federal studies. Moreover, the small
number of state court studies examining education reform cases likewise
report a relationship between a judge's ideology, measured as liberal or
Understood cautiously, the
conservative, and case outcomes.2 35
attitudinal model may help to explain intrastate shifts over time with
respect to judicial underutilization,236 as well as dynamic shifts in
underutilization with respect to particular socio-economic rights and not
others.237
3.

Agency Costs and Reduced Monitoring

Underutilization also may be explained through a theory of agency
costs that predicts "greater majoritarianism, weaker rights, and more
frequent amendment" of a subconstitution.2 38 Because the federal
government monitors the state for compliance with federal norms, the
subnational constitution is assumed to play a less important constraining
role on government, producing a polity that is more majoritarian and less
rights protective than the federal.239 Similarly, because the federal
Constitution provides a floor for rights protection, citizens and judges are
relieved of pressure to be vigilant in their enforcement of state
constitutional rights.240
Conversely, one might argue that a state constitution acquires
greater importance (and the need for judicial monitoring of agency action
233. See Richard H. Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 976
(2009) (stating that "political scientists employing a so-called 'attitudinal model' have
achieved notable success in predicting the justices' votes based solely on whether
newspaper editorials classified them as 'liberal' or 'conservative' at the time of their
nominations").
234. For a discussion of the "major limitations" of the attitudinal model, see Michael
J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1733, 1748-55 (2003).
235. See Bauries, supra note 69, at 719-20 (stressing the need for "further inquiry on
a broader scale" before concluding "that judicial attitudes, beliefs, or philosophies are the
most likely explanation for the outcomes of education finance litigation").
236. See, e.g., Betsy Griffing, The Rise and Fall of the New Judicial Federalism
Under the Montana Constitution, 71 MONT. L. REv. 383 (2010) (discussing Montana
Court's interpretive retrenchment since the 1990s).
237. See Thro, supra note 114, at 235 (examining the effect of changes in judicial
composition on outcomes in education cases).
238. See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 3, at 1602.
239. See id. at 1603.
240. Id. at 1605 (stating "[o]ur prediction is that the reduction in agency costs at the
level of the state may lead to efforts to reduce some rights protections").
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increases), in areas that are not subject to federal oversight-an area that
embraces socio-economic rights which are absent entirely from the
federal Constitution. The "renaissance" of state constitutional law traces
in part to in the 1970s, at the end of the Warren Court, when Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. characterized "the Court's contraction of federal
rights and remedies on grounds of federalism ... as a plain invitation to
state courts to step into the breach."2 4 1 Many of the cases in which the
Court withheld constitutional protection involve such socio-economic
issues as care of the poor, public schooling, and housing, all of which fall
within the scope of some state constitutional positive rights provisions.242
One might argue that the state judiciary's persistent or increasing
underutilization of state constitutional socio-economic rights reflects a
reaction to federal developments that have signaled an increase in federal
monitoring in the relevant substantive areas. During the 1990s, the
federal government initiated a number of important programs pertinent to
education and welfare that garnered a great deal of political attention.
The federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,243 for example, reshaped
educational policy by emphasizing standards and testing as significant
benchmarks; following the statute's lead, states enacted laws and
regulations to make clear what students "are expected to know and be
Many
able to do at various stages in their K-12 education." 24
commentators predicted a new wave of state education cases, with claims
based on the state constitution but theories and proof dependent on
national educational standards.245 Similarly, the national governmentending "welfare as we know it"-eliminated statutory entitlements to
public assistance and, in the name of "third-way" politics and
241. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548
(1986); see also Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State ConstitutionalLaw, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 907 (2003) (stating that "[t]he
dominant theme in the resurgent state constitutional jurisprudence of the last quartercentury has been the effort of many scholars and jurists to find in state constitutions a
progressive alternative to the conservative turn federal constitutional doctrine has taken
in the Burger and Rehnquist eras").
242. See Hershkoff,supra note 6, at 1132-33.
243. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (2005). For a
criticism of the statute, see Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality in Educational
Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2044, 2051 (2006) (emphasizing that "federal education
policy has done little to reduce interstate disparities and, in important ways, reinforces
such disparities").
244. James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L.
REv. 1223, 1223 (2008).
245. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political
Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76
VA. L. REv. 349 (1990) (discussing the emergence of standards-based state reform
litigation).
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"compassionate conservatism," triggered new state-based programs.246
These federal statutory developments, while not preempting state laws in
any formal sense, perhaps have acted as a perverse form of "legislative
constitutionalism" that signaled a decreased need for state judicial
monitoring of state-protected socio-economic guarantees.247
B.

The ConstrainingEffect of FederalRemedial Doctrine on State
JudicialSelf-Conception

The political science explanations of judicial underutilization of
state constitutional socio-economic rights share a common view: that
law and doctrine do not act as significant constraints on state court
decision making. Critics of non-law explanations have argued that the
emphasis on strategic and ideological considerations does not capture the
effects of these factors when they are intrinsic to law. Thus, for example,
Judge Harry T. Edwards, Jr., recently has countered that differences in
legal results among federal appellate judges may be explained by
"legitimate differences in legal reasoning, properly understood."2 4 8 In
this section, we explore whether federal constitutional doctrine acts as a
constraint on state judicial practice.249 Comparative law scholars
frequently warn of the dangers of legal transplants. Doctrines or
procedures that effectively work in one system may produce deleterious
effects in another system given differences in political culture,
constitutional frameworks, and other contextual factors. Our hypothesis
is that state underutilization of state constitutional socio-economic rights
may be traced to an inappropriate reliance on doctrines that are typical to
federal public law cases and help to maintain important boundariesbetween national power and the states, and between Article III courts and
the political branches-but are inapposite and produce negative
consequences when relocated to state courts.

246. On the "third way," see, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE
RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1998) (describing a political middle ground between
state socialism and laissez-faire capitalism). On "compassionate conservatism," compare
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Why Conservative JurisprudenceIs Compassionate, 89 VA. L.
REv. 753 (2003), with William P. Marshall, The Empty Promise of Compassionate
Conservatism: A Reply to Judge Wilkinson, 90 VA. L. REv. 355 (2004).
247. For a discussion of legislative constitutionalism, see, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretationof the Familyand Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003).
248. Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the FactorsAffecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1895, 1901 (2009).
249. But see generally Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The
Nature and Function ofJudicialReview, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004) (discussing the
role of doctrine in theories of judicial review).
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We argue that these doctrines, aimed at reducing friction between
an unelected federal judiciary and elected state officials, are irrelevant to
state court litigation-or, at the least, ought to be significantly adapted to
account for the different institutional position of the state systems. We
first discuss the concept of constitutional constraint. We then explore
three federal doctrines that we believe inappropriately inhibit state courts
from carrying out their distinct judicial duty in state constitutional socioFinally, we close by linking state judicial
economic cases.
underutilization of state constitutional positive rights to the federal
court's retreat from "institutional reform" litigation involving state and
local government.
1.

Constitutional Constraint and State-Federal Judicial Relations

Let us quickly specify what we mean by federal constitutional
constraint in the context of judicial underutilization of independent state
sources. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law shall be the
"supreme Law of the Land" and that state judges are bound to enforce
federal law.250 Constitutional constraint thus could refer simply to the
binding precedential effect of Supreme Court decisions in state cases that
implicate federal issues. 251 However, we use the term constitutional
constraint in a different, and more foundational, sense; namely, that
federal constitutional doctrine, and particularly federal doctrine
concerning constitutional remedies, frames state judges' implicit
understandings of their role and so of their appropriate relation to the
other branches of state governance. To borrow from Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., "The Constitution constrains officials most fundamentally and
pervasively by helping create the context-including the official roles or
offices-in which questions of constitutional constraint and even some
questions of official motivation arise."252 These understandings exist
apart from formal state constitutional requirements and despite an
absence of formal federal requirement.
We suggest that in many states federal doctrine has been implicitly
transplanted into a state's constitutional regime, where it exercises an
indirect but pervasive effect in defining the shape and content of the state
judge's role: the framing effects of federal doctrine inappropriately
250. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
251. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 592-93 (1987)
(discussing the concept of binding precedent). On the complex question of Supreme
Court review of state court judgments involving state-law claims, see, e.g., Laura S.
Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law
Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002) (discussing the antecedent theory of Supreme
Court review).
252. Fallon, supra note 233, at 987.
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inhibit state judges from fully utilizing the political and legal space
created by state constitutional socio-economic provisions. The federal
negative-rights model of constitutionalism limits the judicial power and
cabins the relation of the national government to the states.2 53
Justiciability, a doctrinal consequence of Article III, sets the contours of
the state judge's role despite the absence of a case or controversy
requirement from many state constitutions.25 4 Notions of institutional
capacity, rooted in the formal and functional aspects of federal separation
of powers, inhibit state judicial activity even in circumstances where the
state court enjoys a superior institutional advantage to the state
legislature or executive. 2 55 So, too, we argue that federal remedial
doctrine--conceptually related to justiciability and concerns of
federalism 256 -constrains state courts in their efforts to enforce state
constitutional socio-economic rights despite their traditional font of
common law and equitable authority.
The literature repeatedly confirms that state courts significantly rely
on federal doctrine-a pattern that goes far beyond what the literature
describes as "lock step" interpretation.25 7 Abbe R. Gluck, in a recent
article on state methods of statutory interpretation, writes that "state
courts . . . import without distinction federal-textualist institutional and
constitutional arguments and expressly assume that the same
justifications hold for the states as well." 25 8 Richard Briffault points out
that state courts rely on federal doctrine even when interpreting state
constitutional fiscal and taxpayer provisions that have no federal

253. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 414 (1990) ("The
debate over the significance of the difference between positive and negative rights is part
of the even larger debate on the proper relationship between the federal and state
governments with respect to each other and to individual liberties.").
254. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the
JudicialFunction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, at 1876-98 (2001) (discussing Article III
justiciability doctrine and state judicial power). See also Paul J. Katz, Standing in Good
Stead: State Courts, FederalStandingDoctrine, and Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1315, 1316 (2005) (discussing state statutes that allow "plaintiffs to litigate
complaints based on federal law, even though the plaintiffs do not satisfy the injury-infact requirement of Article III").
255. See Hershkoff, supra note 254, at 1882-97 (discussing effect of federal
separation of powers doctrine on state justiciability doctrine).
256. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciabilityand RemediesAnd Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633 (2006) (positing that
concerns about remedial manageability affect federal determinations that a case is
nonjusticiable).
257. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw,
84 VA. L. REV. 389, 419 (1998) (describing the "lure of lockstep" review for state courts
in the absence of state community).
258. Gluck, supranote 15, at 1858.
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analogue. 25 9 Neal Devins observes generally that "state constitutionalism
remains in the shadow of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal
Constitution."260 Conversely, commentators report that decisions in state
constitutional socio-economic cases do not significantly correlate to
separation-of-powers clauses that are unique to state documents.261
Although these state court practices are pervasive, we emphasize that our
argument does not depend on a state court's citation to federal cases.
Rather, we are concerned with the constitutive nature of federal doctrine
in defining both the state judicial role and the appropriate scope of state
judicial remedial power. The unconscious borrowing by one system of
another system's law is a form of intellectual homage, but it ignores
important distinctions and undermines judicial performance. 2 62
2.

Federal Remedial
Federalism"

Doctrine,

Justiciability,

and

"Our

Article III constrains federal judicial power in a number of familiar
ways: the demands of separation of powers insist that litigants
demonstrate injuries that are "personal and present" before the Court will
remedy injuries that implicate collective harms;26 3 the New Deal
compromise assumes that the Court will defer to Congress on matters
involving social and economic concern under the test of rationality
review; 2 64 concerns of federalism tilt the Court against the exercise of
jurisdiction in cases involving state defendants; 2 65 and the theory of
enumerated power cabins the Court's equitable and common law law259. See Briffault, supra note 241, at 956 (observing that the state courts employ
federal models of deference when interpreting state fiscal limits).
260. Devins, supra note 217, at 1636. One might hypothesize that federal law lends
either political cover or prestige to state court judges in their decision making.
261. See Bauries, supra note 69, at 743-46 (Table 1, "Judicial Review Level
Separation of Powers Cross Tabulation," and Table 2, "Directional Measures," asking
whether "explicit separation of powers clauses in many state constitutions merely [are]
superfluous").
262. Cf Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the
Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1378, 1401 (1985)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) and

underscoring "that the development of legal doctrine that is internally inconsistent, or that
draws artificial or meaningless distinctions, or that disingenuously disregards wellestablished legal rules, or that inexplicably ignores the rational contours of the provision
being interpreted, or that is too ambiguous to apply to future cases, does not constitute
legitimate performance of the judicial function").
263. See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 247 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634
(1950)).
264. See G. Edward White, The ConstitutionalJourney of Marbury v. Madison, 89
VA. L. REV. 1463, 1570 (2003) (noting that the Carolene Products compromise affords
Congress broad latitude "in the area of economic activity").
265. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 18-21
(2001) (discussing federalism limits on federal jurisdiction).
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making authority.266 Taken together, these doctrines dramatically narrow
the availability of declaratory and equitable relief in federal
constitutional cases involving state defendants. State courts, however,
differ structurally from those of the Article III system along a number of
different dimensions, and these differences ought to affect the
availability of relief against state and local officials in state cases
involving state constitutional positive rights.
a.

Justiciability and Declaratory Judgments

Some commentators-call them rights equilibrants-hypothesize
that remedial concerns have implications for Article III justiciability
doctrine.267 To take two examples, the "redressability" component of
Article III standing ties the question of justiciability to an assessment of
whether appropriate and effective judicial remedies are available.2 68
Similarly, concerns about judicially manageable standards may persuade
the court that a claim should be dismissed under the political question
doctrine. 2 69 Conversely, federal justiciability doctrine may constrain an
Article III court's remedial authority. The Supreme Court has held, for
example, that standing for equitable relief, as distinct from damages,
must be independently established.270 In City ofLos Angeles v. Lyons,271
the Court concluded that an African-American man who had been
choked into unconsciousness by police officers applying a departmentapproved restraint had standing to seek damages but not an injunction to
stop the practice, because it was "no more than speculation" that he
would be subject in future to the policy. 27 2
The effects of justiciability doctrine also may be seen in the history
of the federal declaratory judgment. It is familiar ground that the Court
266. See Judith Resnik, ConstrictingRemedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,
and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 231 (2003) (discussing how the Rehnquist Court
"refram[ed] the power of federal judges by disabling their remedial capacities").
267. See Fallon, supra note 256, at 637 (stating that the Equilibration Thesis "holds
that courts, and especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard
as an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights,
and available remedies").
268. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (clarifying that the
"redressability" component of standing requires that the court have the power and ability
to provide meaningful relief for an Article III injury alleged by plaintiff).
269. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (referring to "a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards").
270. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983).
27 1. Id.
272. Id. In dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the Lyons majority for "fragmenting
the standing inquiry and imposing a separate standing hurdle with respect to each form of
relief," calling the decision a significant departure from the Court's "traditional
conception of the standing requirement and of the remedial powers of the federal courts."
Id. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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long resisted making declaratory relief available in federal courtsdespite its use in state and foreign courts--on the ground that the practice
is nonjudicial and outside the Article III power. 27 3 Although Congress
finally enacted a federal declaratory judgment statute and the Court
eventually "dispelled . . . doubts" that the declaratory action is
unconstitutional,274 arguably a skeptical residue persists in the special
rules that govern this form of relief: in treating the declaratory judgment
action as procedural only 2 75 when determining the existence of federalquestion jurisdiction;276 in standing requirements that withhold
declaratory relief in cases where government action produces only
generalized harms; 277 and in abstention principles that withhold federal
power where declaratory relief implicates state litigation and state

273. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249
(1933). In response to Wallace, Congress adopted the Declaratory Judgment Act. 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1934).
274. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007) ("There was a
time when this Court harbored doubts about the compatibility of declaratory-judgment
actions with Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement."). See also Recent Case:
Declaratory Judgments-Jurisdiction of Supreme Court to Hear Appeal from State
Court'sDeclaratoryJudgment, 46 HARV. L. REV. 850, 850 (1933) (reporting in 1933 that
"according to all previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court a suit for 'simply a
declaratory judgment' could not constitute a 'case or controversy' within the meaning of
Article III"); C.S. Potts, Some PracticalUses of the DeclaratoryJudgment Law, 22 TEX.
L. REV. 309, 313 (1944) ("The constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act has now
been so fully established that it seems unnecessary here to go into the matter."). See
generally Andrew Bradt, "Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose": Implications of the
History of the DeclaratoryJudgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767,
771-91 (2006) (tracing the history of the state and federal declaratory judgment acts and
stressing that this form of relief is not limited to preventive relief).
275. See generally Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse:
How the DeclaratoryJudgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded Federal
Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REV. 529, 532
(1989) (criticizing the Court's "procedural only" view of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
276. The Court in dictum has suggested that a declaratory judgment action against a
state official regarding a state enforcement action does not meet the well-pleaded
complaint rule. See Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952). See also
David Sloss, Constitutional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 355,
386-88 (2004) (discussing standard for federal jurisdiction for actions seeking only
declaratory and not declaratory and injunctive relief); Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B.
Mushlin, History Comes Calling: Dean Griswold Offers New Evidence About the
JurisdictionalDebate Surrounding the Enactment of the DeclaratoryJudgment Act, 37
UCLA L. REV. 139 (1989) (discussing Congress's concern about justiciability, not federal
question jurisdiction, in considering whether to enact a declaratory judgment procedure
for the federal courts).
277. See Henry P. Giessel, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act in Public Law
Cases, 28 TEX. L. REV. 709, 718 (1950) (criticizing the Court's "case or controversy"
requirement as unduly limiting the availability of federal declaratory relief). See also
Edwin Borchard, The FederalDeclaratoryJudgments Act, 21 VA. L. REv. 35, 41 (1934)
(presenting similar criticism).
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policies. 278 Moreover, the standard for the issuance of a federal
declaratory judgment is discretionary,279 and some courts will decline to
enter such relief if the declaration will not resolve the dispute, 2 80 if its
resolution depends primarily on local issues,2 8 1 or if injunctive relief
would not be available under the same circumstances. 282
The Supreme Court treats state declaratory judgments as if they
were federal actions for purposes of determining whether federalquestion jurisdiction exists; 28 3 some lower federal courts apply federal
law to state declaratory judgments heard after remand or on removal; 28 4
and commentary about state declaratory judgments draws guidance from
federal practice. 2 85 Transplanting federal declaratory judgment doctrine
to state positive rights cases ignores important features of state law.
Although many states require a justiciable controversy as a predicate for
278. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995) (holding that federal courts
have discretion in declaratory judgment actions to defer to state proceedings). See also
Grace M. Giesel, The Expanded Discretion of Lower Courts to Regulate Access to the
Federal Courts After Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.: Declaratory Judgment Actions and
Implications FarBeyond, 33 Hous. L. REv. 393 (1996) (attributing the Wilton rule to the
federal court's desire to control its workload).
279. See Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 471 (1945) ("The
extent to which the declaratory judgment procedure may be used in the federal courts to
control state action lies in the sound discretion of the Court.").
280. E.g., Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1961) (affirming as an
appropriate exercise of discretion denial of declaratory relief that would not resolve the
controversy).
281. See Kim V. Marrkand & Stephen T. Murray, Declaratory Judgment Suits,
MASSACHUSETTS LIABILITY INSURANCE MANUAL, § 11-1, at *5 (2009) (reporting "that
the U.S. Supreme Court has guided federal district courts away from declaratory
judgment actions that appear to involve primarily local issues between an insurer and
policyholder").
282. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
283. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 18
(1983) (extending the jurisdiction rule in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339
U.S. 67 (1950) from federal to state declaratory judgments); see also Doernberg &
Mushlin, supra note 275, at n.208 and accompanying text (observing that under
Franchise Tax Board, "if the action has been brought under a state provision, one must
pretend that it was really brought pursuant to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act").
284. See, e.g., Huth v. Hartford Ins. Co., 298 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2002) (according the
same discretion over a state declaratory judgment as a federal declaratory judgment);
Steven Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, Judicial Abstinence: Ninth Circuit Jurisdictional
Celibacyfor Claims Brought Under the FederalDeclaratoryJudgment Act, 27 SEATTLE
U.L. REv. 751, 783-803 (2004) (criticizing Ninth Circuit's expansion of abstention
doctrine in Huth).
285. E.g., Pete Schenkkan, UDJA Declaratory Judgments in Texas Administrative
Law, 9 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 195, 201-04 (2008) (discussing the significance of
Medlmmune for Texas cases); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contractsand JudicialDecisions
Over Whether Insurers Must Defend Insureds That Violate Constitutional and Civil
Rights: An Historicaland Empirical Review of Federal and State Court Declaratory
Judgments 1900-2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995 (2000) (analysis of state and federal
declaratory judgments involving insurance company duty to defend).
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a declaratory judgment action, justiciability doctrine in many states is
less restrictive than its federal counterpart;286 moreover, state courts in
various contexts have emphasized the need to interpret the justiciability
requirement "leniently," liberally, or in favor of the public interest.287 In
addition, while the majority of states have adopted a version of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, 288 some states, unlike the federal
system, treat the declaratory procedure as mandatory, and not as
discretionary. For example, Texas courts are "duty-bound to declare the
rights of the parties."289
b.

Federalism, Sovereign Immunity, and Statewide Injunctions

Concerns of federalism likewise inhibit federal courts from
exercising power or imposing remedies in constitutional cases involving
state defendants. These concerns find expression in a number of related
doctrines. The common law principle of sovereign immunity, as well as
the Eleventh Amendment, sharply limits the federal courts' power to
adjudicate constitutional cases involving state-government defendants
and forecloses certain kinds of equitable remedies even in cases where
jurisdiction is available. The Court has held that Congress lacks power
under Article I of the federal Constitution to abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity, and that Congress can do so only when acting under its

286. See Note, DeclaratoryJudgments in ConstitutionalLitigation, 51 HARV. L. REV.
1267, 1275 (1938) (discussing the effect of the absence of a "case or controversy"
requirement "in most state constitutions" on the constitutionality of the declaratory
procedure).
287. Ryan R. Dreyer, Case Note: Civil Procedure-DiscouragingDeclaratory
Actions in Minnesota-The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Judgments in Light of
State v. Joseph, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 619 n.40 (2002) (stating that "[a]lthough
the constitutional requirement of justiciability generally requires genuine or present
controversy, this requirement is viewed leniently in actions for declaratory judgment");
Sean Gay, Note, Declaratory Relief and Sovereign Immunity in Oregon: Can Someone
Tell Me if I Turned Square Corners?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 569 & n.36 (2004)
(discussing Oregon's liberal rule of construction for declaratory judgments). Professor
Borchard argued against limiting the declaratory procedure to justiciable controversies.
See E.M.B., The DeclaratoryJudgment Constitutional,31 YALE L.J. 419, 420-21 (1922)
("Whether this limitation is essential is questionable.").
288. See Daniel Maldonado & Steven Plitt, The Practical Ramifications of Dual
Sovereignty in Prosecuting Declaratory Judgment Actions Against State and Federal
Governments, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 445, 445 & n.4 (2008) (collecting state statutes). See
generally Edwin M. Borchard, The Uniform Act on DeclaratoryJudgments, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 697, 697 (1921) (discussing the history of the Act).
289. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City of Austin, 728 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. App.
1987). Similarly, the Arizona declaratory judgment statute is a "pure grant of jurisdiction
by the state legislature, not a grant of discretionary jurisdiction." See Plitt & Rogers,
supra note 284, at 787.
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Section 5 power, 29 0 but only if the remedy has "congruence and
proportionality" with the "conduct transgressing the Fourteenth
,,291
Federal statutes affecting
Amendment's substantive provisions.
pursuant to Article
enacted
are
social and economic conditions typically
I; this means that even if an officer suit can be filed under the theory of
Ex parte Young, 29 2 a federal court will be barred from ordering
retrospective remedies against state defendants because of the budgetary
implications of the equitable decree.293 Indeed, the Court has expanded
the notion of sovereign immunity to foreclose Congress from imposing
the "indignity" of federally created state-court remedies against states
that violate federal law.294 Even where congressional power is not at
issue, principles of "Our Federalism" act as an equitable restraint on
judicial remedial authority on the view that the unelected federal courts
should not interfere with the executive and legislative activities of
sovereign states.295 Thus, in Rizzo v. Goode,296 the Court reversed the
issuance of an injunction against the Philadelphia Police Departmentdespite findings of racially motivated police brutality-on the ground
that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a "real and immediate injury"
and so the case was not justiciable. Justice Rehnquist emphasized,
however, that even if the matter were justiciable, abstention would be
warranted:

290. Compare Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (affirming Congressional
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the
Indian Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity and, further, that an Ex parte Young action is not available to fill the remedial
gap where Congress has enacted a remedial scheme).
291. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) ("There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end.").
292. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908).
293. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (barring prospective
injunction for federal statutory welfare benefits wrongfully withheld in violation of
federal law by the state).
294. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999); see also Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) ("The preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities.").
295. See Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 854 (Aspen Publishers 5th ed.
2007) (discussing extension of the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), "to limit a federal court's ability to adjudicate constitutional challenges to state
and local executive conduct").
296. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974) (reversing injunctive relief on grounds of ripeness in suit challenging intentional
racial discrimination by municipal court system).
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[T]he principles of federalism which play such an important part in
governing the relationship between federal courts and state
governments . . . have applicability where injunctive relief is sought,
not against the judicial branch of the state government, but against
those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local
297
governments.
Finally, federalism provides support for the Court's refusal to locate
positive rights in the Fourteenth Amendment or in other enumerated
provisions of the Constitution.298
Federal doctrines of judicial restraint are aimed at ensuring political
space for state regulatory activity. The doctrine holds no purchase when
a state court seeks to enforce a state constitutional right against a state
official. At a formal level, the Eleventh Amendment constrains the
Article III courts, but does not pertain to a state's amenability to suit in
its own courts on state-law claims. Nor should these immunity
principles, even broadly conceived, have any bearing on the availability
of declaratory relief. The history of the state declaratory judgment
procedure reflects a clear understanding that the device would be
available to test the constitutionality of state legislation, a view that
Professor Borchard repeatedly made in his influential writings on the
subject.299 Second, to the extent the Court has justified its immunity
doctrine on a need to preserve "representative government" in the
states, 300 extending this principle to the states undermines the principle of
federalism that Alden is intended to protect. The result, limiting state
law-making, is particularly inapt where the state, through its state
constitution, has undertaken regulatory responsibility that the federal

297. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380.
298. See Gerhardt, supra note 253, at 416 ("For every positive right .. . [the
Fourteenth Amendment] imposes, the federal courts' power increases with a
corresponding decrease in both state autonomy and resources.").
299. See Borchard, supra note 288, at 711 (discussing use of the declaratory judgment
procedure to challenge the constitutionality of legislation); see also Note, Challengingthe
Validity of a Federal Tax by Means of the DeclaratoryJudgment, 44 YALE L.J. 1451,
1453 (1935) ("The declaratory judgment is admirably suited to the determination of
broad constitutional questions, since it gives to both the citizen and the administration an
early declaration of rights before expensive commitments are made.").
300. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999) ("If the principle of representative
government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests
must be reached after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of
the State ... not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by
the private citizen."); cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the
Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429, 431 (2002) (stating that
the Court's federalism doctrine limits Congressional regulatory capacity to "preserve
spheres in which state and local governments are the exclusive lawgivers").
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Constitution does not address. 30 1 Third, federal immunity doctrine, as
traced to the radiating effects of the Tenth Amendment,3 02 also is
justified as a way to maintain the political accountability of state and
federal officials as distinct decision makers. 30 3 State judicial decrees do
not implicate accountability concerns of this sort; although separation of
powers may be pertinent, judicial participation in the enforcement of a
state constitutional socio-economic right reflects the distinct structure
and institutional capacities of the different state branches of government.
c.

Common Law Power, Equitable Authority, and Constitutional
Remedies

Finally, the movement into a post-Erie universe has affected
understandings of the scope of federal common law and equitable
authority to craft remedies that-unlike the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment-are not specified in the constitutional text.3 04 As Professor
Fallon has written, "The founding generation almost certainly expected
the courts to implement the Constitution through a scheme of common
law remedies-but in a pre-Erie conceptual universe in which it was
apparently not understood (as it is today) that law is necessarily the
product of some duly authorized state or federal lawmaker."'30 The last
forty years have witnessed a constricting of federal common law and
equitable authority: the Court has withheld declaratory relief where it
306
would produce a coercive effect similar to that of an injunction,
limited equitable power to those forms of relief that existed at the time of

301. In such settings, the conservative values of federal unelected judges would be
constraining state majoritarian and judicial outcomes. Cf Fallon, Jr., supra note 300, at
434 (stating that "[i]n many if not most cases, judicial protection of federalism has the
effect of limiting liberal forces and doctrines . . .[as well as] outcomes that [by state and
local decision makers] that judicial conservatives find substantively objectionable").
302. U.S. CONsT. amend. X (providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people"). See Helen Hershkoff, Horizontality and the "Spooky"
Doctrines ofAmerican Law, 59 BUFF. LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2011).
303. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-68 (1992). But see Neil S. Siegel,
Commandeeringand Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629,
1632 (2006) ("It is not clear that political accountability is a Tenth Amendment value, let
alone one that the Court is charged with vindicating broadly and aggressively through a
categorical rule.").
304. Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
305. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 693, 717 (2009); see also Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of
ConstitutionallyCompelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 82 (1997) (tying "the history of
constitutional remedies in diversity to the development of constitutional remedies more
generally").
306. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
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the founding,30 7 and disclaimed federal common law power to create
causes of action to redress the federal Constitution as well as to enforce
federal statutes absent express legislative authorization.3 0
Theoretical support for these trends comes from a view of the
Article III courts as "federal tribunals," cabined within the separate
domains of the different branches and lacking inherent remedial
authority. 3 09 As Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, justifying its refusal
to imply a private enforcement mechanism for a federal statute, "Raising
up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper
function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals." 310
Wherever one stands in this debate,311 state courts remain common-law
generalists with equitable and inherent authority to create law, shape
policy, and devise remedies. 3 12 Moreover, this law-making policy is an
accepted feature of state governance, essential to the development of the
rules and standards governing contracts, torts, property, and family
relations, and so integral to a system of separated powers that "blur[s]"
the formal categories of federal law.313
3.

Socio-Economic Rights and "Institutional Reform" Litigation

The Court's narrowing of the federal court's remedial authority
perhaps has been most pronounced in a category of cases known as
307. See Grupo Mexicano de Dessarrolla, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S.
308, 333 (1999) (rejecting use of injunction to preserve assets because the remedy
"historically" was not available at equity).
308. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (limiting Bivens remedy).
But see Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution,68 S. CAL.
L. REv. 289, 303-21 (1995) (questioning the view that separation of powers and lack of
institutional capacity prevent the federal courts from enforcing the Constitution).
309. Compare Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1178-80 (1989) (discussing the incompatibility of common law decision making
with Article III limited power), with Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal
Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REv. 891 (2002) (challenging Justice Scalia's
argument).
310. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (quoting Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilvertson, 501 U.S. 350, 365 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). But see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Were we bereft of the
common law, our federal system would be impotent.").
311. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1986) ("The appropriate bounds for federal common law have
always been unclear."). For the classic defense of the Article III court's common law
power, see Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-andof the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
312. See Harry H. Wellington, The Nature ofJudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486
(1982) (observing that "[w]hile we may disagree strongly with particular decisions, we
rarely question the authority of common-law courts, even in pivotal cases").
313. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Judicial Federalism and the
Administrative States, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 613, 619 (1999).
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"institutional reform," "structural reform," and "public law" litigationcases seeking to enforce federal constitutional or statutory rights against
state or local governments.3 14 Federalism figures prominently in
criticisms of such actions, with the court justifying its hands-off
approach as essential to protect state autonomy. 1 5 Federal decrees in
such cases are said to "involve the taking over of institutions of state or
local government" 3 16 and thus are illegitimate because "the Constitution
does not permit the federal courts to exercise their remedial powers to
engage in the structural reform of local institutions and local
government."3 17 Moreover, as the Court explained in Horne v. Flores,3 18
vacating a federal order concerning a state's non-compliance with the
federal Equal Education Opportunities Act, "Federalism concerns are
heightened when . .. a federal court decree has the effect of dictating
state or local budget priorities." 319 Separation of powers likewise figures
into the discussion, usually focusing on the federal court's limited power
to devise equitable remedies-such as desegregation orders-in the
absence of congressional authority.320
The label "public law" litigation now routinely extends in academic
literature to state court litigation involving state constitutional socioeconomic rights. 32 1 But there may be perverse consequences to attaching
a label that grows out of federal practice to the state courts. Discussions
of public law litigation share certain premises about the judicial
function-about the ways in which courts function, the ways courts
interact with the other branches, and the ways in which constitutional
rights are elaborated and enforced-that are said to create institutional
and conceptual problems for the practice. These premises, however,
diverge from the situation of state courts when asked to enforce state

314. The canonical reference is Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). See Sabel & Simon, supra note 91, at 1082
("The Rehnquist Court has been unsympathetic to public law litigation.").
315. See John C. Jeffries & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95
CALIF. L. REv. 1387, 1387 (2007) (referring to "the issues of federalism inherent in the
management of state and local institutions").
316. Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
949, 971 (1978).
317. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor'sFoot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1996).
318. Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009).
319. Id. at 2594. But see id. at 2621 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the
case, involving the state's failure to comply with a federal statute, involves "'institutional
litigation"').
320. Id. (criticizing the Court's use of inherent remedial authority and raising
separation of powers concerns).
321. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 91, at 1022-29 (characterizing state
constitutional education cases as public law litigation).
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constitutional socio-economic rights.322 By assimilating state practice to
the federal model, commentators indirectly may be inhibiting state courts
from utilizing the political space that federalism is intended to promote.
C.

InstitutionalDifferentiation and State ConstitutionalEnforcement

The state court's underutilization of state constitutional socioeconomic rights is a complex phenomenon. Certainly the political
science models have some explanatory force. But it is a commonplace
that institutional design affects constitutional enforcement. We have
tried to show that federal remedial doctrine may be exercising a
constraining effect on state courts in their assumptions about the
justiciability of positive rights and their willingness to use common law
and equitable authority in devising remedies.
While we do not wish to overstate the institutional differences
between federal and state courts, state court practice that mimics the
federal ignores significant differences that appropriately ought to affect
the shape and nature of judicial review in positive rights cases. 323
Discretion always has played an important role in federal doctrine, with
prudential restraint favoring the political branches and the states. The
resurgence of state constitutional cases emerged partly as a response to
the gap created by the Court's exercise of discretion in favor of the status
quo, in terms of withholding federal jurisdiction and federal remedies,
and its insistence that disputes involving welfare, housing, and education
be reserved to the states and so placed outside federal constitutional
protection. It would be perverse if Article III remedial doctrine,
narrowly interpreted in federal public law cases in the name of
federalism, inhibited state courts from participating fully in state
constitutional disputes involving "areas of core state responsibility."324
CONCLUSION

State courts, no less than state legislatures, serve as important
"laboratories of experimentation" in our federal system. We have seen
that some state courts have made use of their traditional common law and
equitable authority to devise an array of remedial strategies for the
enforcement of state constitutional socio-economic rights. In certain
respects, the approaches deployed by these courts resemble similar
322. In some states, for example, the constitution guarantees a judicial "remedy" for
"every injury." See Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2003).
323. See Williams, supra note 32, at 229 (referring to the "uniqueness .. . of
American state constitutions" and trying "to link these differences to state constitutional
interpretation approaches that differ from federal constitutional interpretation").
324. Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009).
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endeavors abroad, where national constitutional courts have confronted
claims of socio-economic right under their national constitutions.
Though largely unheralded, the engagement of these state courts with
positive rights antedates efforts abroad, and offers alternative strategies
to those seen in foreign courts.
These state practices deserve
considerably more attention and credit. Equally worthy of attention is
the extent to which a federal conception of judicial power has continued,
in visible and insidious ways, to influence state judicial practice and to
inhibit state courts from playing their distinctive roles in the enforcement
of state constitutional rights.

